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This study examines an obstacle to commerce on the Internet and the World 
Wide Web posed by a popular belief that the Internet and Web lack the 
technology needed for secure fmancial transactions. The reality behind such a 
belief has a direct effect upon commercial and financial transactions by DOD in 
view of an Executive Order that mandates Internet usage for electronic 
transactions. This study details and evaluates the methods available for secure 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The number oflnternet hosts has significantly increased since its development by the 
Department of Defense. The number of Internet hosts connected in August 1981 was 213 
(Internet Society, 1996). This number has grown to 12.88 million hosts in July 1996 and 
is projected to reach 33.96 million by January 1998 (Internet Society, 1996). The number 
oflnternet users in 1996 is estimated to be 9.8 million (O'Reilly, 1996). This number is 
expected to increase five times to 52 million by the year 2000 (Forrester, 1995). 
The explosion in the number of hosts being connected to the Internet is accelerating 
the trend towards business use of open networks for conducting electronic commerce 
(Roche, 1995). More than 80,000 companies use the Internet for distribution of critical 
company information (Roche, 1995). Retail sales on the Internet reached $350 million in 
1995. This figure is projected to reach $6.9 billion by the year 2000 (Eicher and Modahl, 
1995). Still, these numbers are insignificant when compared to other markets. For 
instance, the print catalog industry reached $57 billion in 1995 (Kline, 1995) and global 
credit card sales totaled $3 trillion in 1995 (Lister, 1996). 
Several barriers are preventing electronic commerce from achieving its full potential 
as a commercial medium. Security is the primary obstacle to electronic commerce. 
Surveys have found that users cite security concerns as the number one reason for not 
buying merchandise on the Internet. They feel that their credit card numbers can be 
easily stolen while being transmitted over the Internet (Faulkner & Gray Inc., 1995; 
Gupta, 1996; Jaffee, 1996). However, the reality is that financial transactions on the 
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Internet are safe. They are as secure or more secure than conventional credit card 
transaction methods, especially when encryption is used (Busch, 1996; Dahl, 1995; 
Forrester, 1996; Grossman, 1996; Kline, 1995; Lynch, 1996; Netscape, 1996; Power, 
1996; Roche, 1995; Wilson, 1996). Other barriers which are limiting the growth of 
electronic commerce include access and speed (Wilson, 1996), the absence of online 
dynamic content directories (Hoffman et al., 1996), time required to download Web site 
graphics (Gupta, 1996), lack of sites that offer transactions online (Gens, 1996), and 
startup costs to businesses (Connect, 1996). 
The Department of Defense, of course, developed what is now called the Internet and 
is a major user of its communication capacity. It follows, then, that the DOD and the 
entire U.S. federal government has a stake in the Internet's capability to process secure 
financial transactions. This is particularly true where DOD or other agencies are 
receiving payments, making payments or communicating sensitive documents such as 
bids. This need for communication security will grow as more agencies and commands 
solicit bids from a geographically broad market of vendors through Web sites on the 
World Wide Web. This thesis performs a comprehensive analysis of the available 
fmancial transaction methods and associated security protocols. 
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II. SIZE AND GROWTH OF THE INTERNET AND WORLD WIDE WEB 
A. INTERNET HOSTS 
When trying to measure the size and growth of the Internet, people usually think in 
terms of number of users. However, the first attempts at measuring the size of the 
Internet were aimed at counting the number of computers connected to the Internet. This 
number is both obtainable and measurable (Wiggins, 1995). A computer connected to the 
Internet is referred to as a "host" or "node" on the network (Wiggins, 1995). Hosts were 
relatively easy to count in the early stages ofthe Internet (i.e. early 1980's), they were 
listed in a special Host Table File which was distributed to Internet sites (Wiggins, 1995). 
This system became impractical when thousands of new hosts started to join the Internet. 
The growth in the number of hosts called for a distributed name database, allowing any 
user anywhere on the Internet to locate any other computer. This was the birth of the 
Domain Name System (DNS). The DNS is the part of the Internet that allows users to 
refer to hosts by names like www.nps.navy.mil instead of referring to IP addresses 
(Wiggins, 1995). 
Lotter (Network Wizards, 1996) has conducted periodic surveys of the Domain Name 
System since 1981. Figure 1 illustrates the growth in IP addresses registered from 1989-
1995. A complete list ofhost surveys from 1981 projected through the year 2000 is 
provided in appendix B (Internet Society, 1995). Appendix B also shows the most recent 
survey conducted in July 1996 that details number of hosts, domains, and networks 
(Network Wizards, 1996). 
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Figure 1: IP Addresses Registered Source: Mark Lottor Surveys 
Although these survey results give an accurate picture of the growth of the Internet, 
they still only represent a rough census at any given time. Some organizations have a 
habit of registering hosts before they actually connect to the Internet. Another common 
occurrence is a large percentage of registered hosts being down at any given time 
. (Wiggins, 1995). A recent problem with Lottor' s survey is the growing number of 
organizations who run their computers behind firewalls. This security practice obscures 
their presence on the Internet from the DNS and surveys (Wiggins, 1995). 
The host surveys also give an idea of the domain growth on the Internet. Figure 2 
shows the relative growth of different domains on the Internet in June 1994 (Internet 
Society, 1995). 
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Figure 2: June 1994 Domain Breakdown Source: Internet Society, 1996 
It is interesting to note that the domains such as .com (commercial) and .edu (educational) 
comprise a majority of the host domains. It is enlightening to see the educational domain 
leading all other domains. However, as Figure 3 shows, the commercial domain 
surpassed the educational domain in the number of hosts in January 1995 (Wiggins, 
1995). The survey of July 1995 found that there were 6.64 million host computers on the 
Internet (Network Wizards, 1995). This number has been approximately doubling 
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Demonstrating that the Internet is truly global, the same source indicated that 2.37 million 
of these are international hosts representing 150 countries (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
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The most recent domain survey was conducted July 1996 and is shown in Appendix 
B. It shows 12.88 million hosts on the Internet (Network Wizards, 1996). This number 
is nearly double the July 1995 figure of 6.64 million hosts (Network Wizards, 1996). The 
number of domains on the Internet has also grown. This survey shows 488,000 domains 
on the Internet in July 1996 which is over four times the 120,000 domains measured in 
July 1995 (Network Wizards, 1996). 
The growth in the number oflntemet-connected networks has also significantly 
increased. Appendix B shows that in August 1988 there were 208 networks in the United 
States and 9 networks connected to the Internet outside the United States (Internet 
Society, 1995). Figure 4 shows network growth between 1990 and 1994: 
Worldwide Network Growth 
Jan.'90 Jan.'91 Jan.'92 Jan.'93 Jan.'94 Dec.'94 
Jul.'90 Jul.'91 Jul.'92 Jul.'93 Jul.'94 
Source: Internet Society, 1996 
Figure 4: Network Growth 
The most recent figures indicate that in January 1995 there were 26,681 networks in the 
U.S. and 19,637 networks outside the U.S. for a total of 46,318 networks connected to the 
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Internet worldwide (Internet Society, 1995). Internet Society projects that this number 
will increase to 103,553 networks in the U.S. and 91,269 networks outside the U.S. for a 
total of 194,822 networks worldwide by October 1996 (Appendix B). 
The growth of World Wide Web sites is even more impressive than that ofthe 
Internet; the Web grew over 17 times in 1994 alone and doubles in size roughly every 
two to three months (Hoffman et al., 1995). Figure 5 represents Web server growth in 
1993 and 1994. 
WVVW Server Growth I 
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Figure 5: WWW Server Growth 
Another indication of the relative growth of the Web is to compare it with gopher 
which is another Internet browser application. Figure 6 below represents this 
comparison. The search engine Lycos indexed 8.54 million unique URLs as of October 7, 
1995 (Hoffman et al., 1995). This figure demonstrates the increasing content of Web 
servers. Statistics show that Web traffic now dominates Internet activity. The Web 
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Figure 6: Web Tool Comparison 
accounted for 21.4% oftotal packet traffic and 26.25% oftotal byte traffic in April1995, 
ranking first among all networks on the Internet (Merit Network Inc., 1995). 
B. INTERNET USERS 
Determining the number of users on the Internet is more difficult than counting the 
number of computers connected to the Internet. Early estimates of the number of Internet 
users stemmed from host number calculations. The rule of thumb was 1 0 users for every 
host (Wiggins, 1995). This may have been a good estimate in the mid 1980's when 
mainframes and minicomputers dominated, but now that personal computers and 
workstations are connected directly to the Internet, it is common for one IP address to 
correspond with one user (Wiggins, 1995). 
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Campbell pointed out that in order to estimate total numbers oflnternet users, the 
term Internet user must be defined (Wiggins, 1995). There are many parts of the Internet 
that can be used separately, ranging from e-mail to the Web to applications such as FTP 
and gopher (Wiggins, 1995). Several studies have estimated the number of Internet users 
and all have come up with different figures. It would appear that these results would be 
difficult to reconcile. Closer examination suggests that, apart from methodological flaws 
or survey bias, the differences are reconciled, at least in part, by understanding what is 
meant by Internet use (Hoffinan et al., 1996). 
The first extensive user demographic survey was conducted by Texas Internet 
Consulting (Matrix News, 1995). It was the first to understand the importance of 
defining an Internet user. It proposed three categories oflnternet users. The first 
category was the "Core Internet." Core users were estimated at 7.8 million users of2.5 
million computers that can provide interactive services such as TELNET, FTP, or WWW 
and are capable of serving information on the Internet (Matrix News, 1995). The second 
category was the "Consumer Internet" user. Consumer Internet users comprise an 
estimated 13.5 million users of3.5 million computers that can use the interactive services 
such as FTP or WWW supplied by the Core Internet. The on-line services AOL, Delphi, 
and Bix were included in this estimate (Matrix News, 1995). This user group can browse 
but not serve information. The final user group was defined as the "Matrix." Matrix 
users can exchange electronic mail with other users. The Matrix group is estimated to 
have 27.5 million users (Matrix News, 1995). 
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The Texas Internet Consulting survey later projected their results through September 
1995. The projection yielded estimates of22.6 million Consumer Internet users and 35 
million Matrix users (Matrix News, 1995). Mass market utilities like CompuServe, 
Prodigy, American Online, and Delphi offer some forms of Internet access. This estimate 
is as high as 25%, yielding an overall Consumer Internet user population of 29 million 
(Wiggins, 1995). 
The Texas Internet Consulting survey sent questionnaires by electronic mail to most 
ofthe domains representing organizations on the Internet (Matrix News, 1995). This 
methodology included using the July 1994 Lottor DNS survey to obtain a list of 18,473 
domains (Matrix News, 1995). This survey took place exclusively through electronic 
mail. This presents a bias toward users of electronic mail, often causing inflated 
estimates. Several earlier surveys, Hermes for example, used online questionnaires which 
caused the data to be non-representative and used only for ballpark figures (Hof:finan et 
al., 1995). These survey data were collected in a similar fashion and should be 
considered non-representative. 
O'Reilly & Associates are believed to be the first Internet user survey to use random 
digit dialing into U.S. households. They claim a sampling error ofless than one percent 
(Frook, 1996). Their study placed over 200,000 individual phone calls and conducted 
32,000 screening interviews. Ultimately, 1,000 Internet users and 500 online service 
subscribers were identified and interviewed for an average of37 minutes (O'Reilly, 
1996). The survey found that 5.8 million U.S. adults have direct Internet access at work, 
home or school, while another 3.9 million use commercial online services exclusively. 
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O'Reilly further projected that an additional 6 million adults will add Internet accounts or 
online services with Internet access by October 1996 (O'Reilly, 1996). The O'Reilly 
estimates are relatively low due to their restrictive definition of an Internet user. Their 
definition is an individual 18 or older who has direct access to the Internet, and access to 
e-mail and other Internet applications. The O'Reilly count excludes individuals whose 
only access to the Internet is through an online service (Hoffinan et al., 1996). 
The American Internet User Survey was conducted by Find/SVP in December 1995 . 
The survey was conducted by telephone to 1,000 randomly dialed Internet users. It was 
preceded by focus groups and a series of online surveys. The interviews included 155 in-
depth questions (400 response choices) and lasted over 30 minutes each (Find/SVP, 
1996). To qualify as an Internet user in the Find/SVP survey, respondents had to be 
current users of at least one Internet application beside e-mail. Qualified respondents 
included users who access the Internet form commercial online services, those who use 
Internet service providers, plus corporate and academic server users (Find/SVP, 1996). 
The survey found that 8.4 million adults aged 18 and older use the Internet, 7.4 million 
total users access the Web, and 1.1 million children under age 18 use the Internet. 
Overall, 51% of the Internet users interviewed stated they began using the Internet in 
1995, confirming that the Internet audience more than doubled in 12 months prior to the 
survey (Find/SVP, 1996). 
The CommerceNet/Nielson Internet demographic study (CNIDS) was released 
October 30, 1995. This was the first non-proprietary, industry-wide survey of Internet 
demographics. CommerceNet is a non-profit consortium of firms dedicated to promoting 
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electronic commerce. This study was the first-ever population projectable, representative 
survey of who uses the Internet. Nielson Media Research was chosen to administer the 
survey (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
CNIDS addresses three types of users in the U.S. and Canada: Internet users, online 
service users, and non-users. A baseline questionnaire was made up of 40 multiple-part 
questions, and the actual survey involved a sample of approximately 280,000 telephone 
calls and yielded more than 4,200 telephone based interviews (Massotto, 1995). Nielson 
used a random digit dial sample frame for this study. Researchers stratified the sample 
frame by geography to provide proportionate geographic distribution of telephone 
numbers. Nielson selected a systematic sample of telephone numbers to ensure equal 
probability. Interviews were conducted with a randomly selected member (16 years or 
older) of a randomly selected household. The data was weighted to reflect household 
differences such as multiple telephone lines. The study was designed to net 
approximately 1,000 completed interviews for each of the three types ofusers (Massotto, 
1995). 
CNIDS found that 37 million total persons aged 16 and above in the U.S. and Canada 
have access to the Internet. The study found that 24 million total persons aged 16 and 
above in the U.S. and Canada have used the Internet in the past three months and 
approximately 18 million total persons aged 16 and older in the U.S. and Canada have 
used the WWW in the past three months (Massotto, 1995). 
The CNIDS study has been criticized by Vanderbilt University's Project 2000. This 
group accepted the raw data gathered by CNIDS, but performed a detailed statistical 
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reanalysis. The Project 2000 group concluded that CNIDS survey estimates were 
inflated. They contend that the weighted sample was not adequately adjusted to the 
population it was intended to represent, and that the estimates lacked logical consistency 
in their definition of an Internet user (Hoffman et al., 1996). Project 2000 used the 1995 
U.S. Census to reweight the raw data. They also established four Internet market 
segments, "Hard Core," "Regular," "Lapsed Regular," and "Infrequent," based on survey 
results of frequency and recency of Internet use and access. The new estimates were 
considerably lower than CNIDS results. Project 2000 found that 28.8 million people in 
the U.S. aged 16 and over have potential or actual access to the Internet, 16.4 million 
people use the Internet, and 11.5 million people use the WWW (Hoffman et al., 1996). 
Another problem arises when attempting to count Internet users by looking at the 
cumulative count of the number of subscriptions to various online services. The 
consumer online services reached 11.3 million customers in January 1996. This 
represents a 78.9% increase over year end 1994 when the subscriber base for the top six 
online services totaled 6.3 million (Information & Interactive Services Report, 1996). 
The number of members reported by these services may be overstated. The online 
service industry encounters a phenomenon known as "chum." This describes the 
tendency of new subscribers to drop out soon after trying a service. Many subscribers 
may not be active users of a given online service, much less active Internet users 
(Wiggins, 1995). The percentage of online service subscribers which use the Internet is 
estimated at only 25% (Wiggins, 1995). 
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A second problem in extrapolating from the cumulative subscriber counts is the issue 
of duplication. Individuals may belong to more than one mass-market utility at one time. 
Some belong to several services. Furthermore, many people who have Internet access 
from their offices or schools may supplement that access by obtaining an independent 
service provider or subscribing to an online service (Wiggins, 1995). 
C. USERDEMOGRAPHICS 
The number of personal computers in U.S. homes is growing. The PC market is also 
"young", since 58% of PC owners have had their PCs for fewer than two years (Ziegler, 
1995). Figure 7 illustrates that 36% ofU.S. households own a PC, 19% of households 
own a modem, and 7% access the Internet (Find/SVP, 1995). Forrester Reasearch 
predicts that these numbers will increase to 42% of households owning a PC and 22% 
having an Internet connection by the year 2000 (Forrester, 1996). 
The demographics of Internet users were found to be similar in all the surveys 
conducted. The table below shows that a majority of Internet users are male, 74% 
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Figure 7: Home PC Penetration 
The non-representative Hermes Internet survey found that the average age of Internet 
users is 32.7 years (Gupta, 1996). The age oflnternet user broken down by percentage is 
illustrated in Figure 8 (O'Reilly, 1996). The Hermes survey found that the median 
income is between $50,000 and $60,000, with the average household income $63,000 
(Gupta, 1996). This estimated median income is substantially higher than the national 
median of $36,950 as reported by the 1993 U.S. Census (Gupta, 1996). The household 
income oflnternet users is broken down by percentage in Figure 9 (O'Reilly, 1996). 
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Figure 8: Age Demographics 
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1994 Household Incomes 
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Figure 9: Income Demographics 
The Hennes survey also reports that 91% of Internet users have at least some college 
education. (Gupta, 1995). Recent research also suggests that the demographics of 
Internet use are shifting over time (Gupta, 1996), the Internet appears to be moving more 
mainstream in its demographic profile and that this trend is likely to continue as the 
Internet moves toward critical mass as a commercial medium (Hoffman, 1996). 
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III. THE WORLD WIDE WEB AS A COMMERCIAL MEDIUM 
The growth of the Internet, and particularly the World Wide Web, has led to a critical 
mass of consumers and firms participating in a global online marketplace. The adoption 
of the Internet as a commercial medium has caused firms to experiment with innovative 
ways of marketing to consumers in computer-mediated environments. These 
developments are expanding beyond the use of the Internet as a communication medium 
to its use as a new market (Ricciuti, 1995). 
These commercial developments are occurring on the graphical interface portion of 
the Internet known as the World Wide Web (WWW or Web). The Web is a distributed 
hypermedia environment which was originally developed by the European Particle 
Physics Laboratory (Hoffman et al., 1995). Global hypermedia allows multimedia 
information to be located on a network of servers around the world which are 
interconnected allowing one to travel through the information by clicking on hyperlinks. 
Hyperlinks (text, icon, or image in a document) are able to point to any document 
anywhere on the Internet (Hoffman et al., 1995). The present popularity ofthe Web as a 
commercial medium results from the ability to facilitate global sharing of information 
and resources, and its potential to provide an efficient channel for advertising, marketing, 
and even direct distribution of goods and information services (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
1.9 
A. CONSUMER BENEFITS 
The Web, as a commercial medium, offers several benefits to the consumer. The first 
of these benefits is the availability of information. The Web offers consumers access to 
greater amounts of dynamic information to support queries for consumer decision making 
(Hoffman et al., 1995). The Internet offers users the opportunity to overcome 
information chaos. Users are able to find information they really want or need in a world 
rife with information overload (Find!SVP, 1995). The Hermes survey of Web users 
found that 79% of respondents indicated that gathering purchase related information was 
the most preferred Web activity (Gupta, 1995). 
The interactive nature ofthe Web allows consumers to initiate and control searches. 
Hence marketing communications on the Web are more consumer-driven than those 
provided by traditional media (Hoffman & Novak, 1995). The benefit of customer-driven 
searches allows consumers to become active participants in the marketing process 
(Hoffman et al., 1995). There is also greater probability of a consumer being well-
informed, since the consumer has a greater control over the search process. Such control 
facilitates a highly developed form of comparison shopping (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
The customer benefits from online trials. The ability of the Web to amass, analyze, 
and control large quantities of specialized data can enable comparison shopping and 
speed the process of finding items (Wallace, 1995). The Web facilitates online trials, 
especially in the software industry, which can provide instant gratification; customers 
can test products online which may prompt purchase. There is also the potential of wider 
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availability ofhard-to-find products and a wider selection of items due to the width and 
efficiency of the channel (Hoffman et al., 1995). 
Industrial consumers realize benefits of reduced costs from increased competition in 
procurement as more suppliers are able to compete in an electronically open marketplace. 
This increase in competition leads to better quality and variety of goods through 
expanded markets and the ability to produced customized goods (liT A, 1994). 
B. MERCHANT BENEFITS 
Merchants benefit from the use of the Web as a distribution channel. The Web offers 
certain classes of merchants a market in which distribution costs or costs-of-sales 
decrease. The merchants most likely affected are those in the publishing, information 
services, and digital product categories (Jones, 1995). For example, digital products and 
software can be delivered immediately. This practice may lead to the eventual 
elimination of the middleman (Michalski, 1995). This may have the effect of shrinking 
the distribution channel, thus making the process more efficient. Overhead costs and 
time to complete transactions may be reduced, translating into additional efficiencies for 
the merchant (Kline, 1995). 
The Web transfers some of the selling functions to customers. The use of online 
ordering and fill-out-forms gives a customer direct participation in the selling functions 
and bring transactions to a conclusion (Michalski, 1995). The Web is not a traditional 
one-way broadcasting setup like television or radio. Merchants can take advantage of this 
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two-way channel by immediately gathering information about customers, thus providing 
a basis for better service. 
Most merchants use the Web primarily to deliver information about the firm and its 
offerings (Magid, 1995). The interactive nature ofthe Web allows merchants to benefit 
by developing customer relationships. This potential for customer interaction facilitates 
relationship marketing and customer support to a greater degree than is possible with 
traditional media (Cuneo, 1995). 
IDC conducted a census of Fortune 500 companies external sites on the Web since 
December 1995. The June 1996 report indicates that 284 companies or 57% of the 
Fortune 500 companies have a presence on the Web (Gens, 1996). IDC predicts this 
number will increase to 390 companies or nearly 80% of the Fortune 500 companies will 
have a presence on the Web by the end of 1996 (Gens, 1996). IDC found that 28% ofthe 
284 Fortune 500 companies with presence on the Web offer some kind of interactive 
feature on their sites. IDC contends that the sites that strictly host content that is purely 
in the form of noninteractive electronic paper are rapidly being displaced by sites 
boasting interactive content (Gens, 1996). Examples ofthe type of interaction offered by 
Fortune 500 companies are: 
1) Database query (65%) e.g., package tracking, flight schedules, rate quotes, 
catalog search, dealer locator, ATM locator 
2) Financial modeling (19%) e.g., mortgage payments, college tuition savings 
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3) Communication (9%) e.g., opinion/content upload, customer service, virtual 
classroom 
4) Simulation (3%) e.g., virtual tour 
The interactive implementations are designed to engage customers in ongoing 
relationships with the firm. The merchant has two objectives in this continuous 
relationship-building. First, the merchant desires to provide the customer with 
information about the firm and its offerings. The second objective is to receive 
information from customers about their needs with respect to offerings. Therefore, the 
merchant benefits from effective customized advertising, promotion, and customer 
service (Berniker, 1995). 
C. STATISTICS 
More than 80,000 companies use the Internet for distribution of critical company 
information such as press releases (Roche, 1995). Nearly 14,000 firms were listed in 
Open Market's "Commercial Services on the Net" directory at the end of 1995. The 
Yahoo Business and Economic directory shows 23,540 entries under "Companies 
(Hoffman et al., 1995)." Although the number of companies seem impressive, O'Reilly 
& Associates' Online Research Group point out that the reach and acceptance of the 
Internet is currently limited. O'Reily researchers randomly sampled from stratified 
databases of North American businesses drawn from the Dun & Bradstreet database of 
over 7 million enterprises (O'Reilly, 1996). A total of 1030 interviews were completed. 
The respondents included 410 large companies (more than 1000 employees), 406 medium 
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(101-999), and 214 small (less than 100 employees). The survey found that 53% of 
medium businesses and 79% of small businesses had no Internet access and no plans to 
acquire one. These figures are represented graphically in Figures 10, 11, and 12 
(O'Reilly, 1996). 
PROPORTION OF LARGE BUSINESSES WITH ACCESS 
TO THE INTERNET 
Current Internet 
Access 
A~H by mid ,.; 
Aceess by end '96 
Access planned 
eventu.lly 
No plans for access 
0~ 20~ 
Figure 10: Large Business Access Source: O'Reilly, 1996 
51% 
60~ 
Don Ulsch concludes that the survey underscores the opportunity that remains for 
businesses on the Internet (O'Reilly, 1996). The survey found that the number oflarge 
and medium size companies online is growing. It found that 51% of large companies 
have Internet access, and another 15% plan to connect to the Internet by the end of 1996. 
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PROPORTION OF MEDIUM BUSINESSES WITH ACCESS 
TO THE INTERNET 
CUrrent Internet 
Access 
Accen by mid '' 
Access by end !6 
Access planned 
e-ventually 
No plans for access 
0" 10" 20"l. 
Figure 11: Medium Business Access 
5396 
40"i. 60"l. 
Source: O'Reilly 1996 
The survey found that 25% of medium sized companies have connected to the Internet, 
and 17% plan to do so by the end of 1996 (O'Reilly, 1996). The study also found that 
35% of large companies and 20% of medium companies surveyed had created a publicly 
accessible WWW site (O'Reilly, 1996). 
Forrester Research also believes that the number of companies connecting to the 
Internet will increase. Figure 13 shows that large (over 1000 employees), medium (100 
to 999 employees), and small (20 to 99 employees) companies will all continue to grow 
through the year 2000 (Eichler and Modahl, 1995). The survey projects over 90% or 7500 
large companies connecting to the Internet by the year 2000. Forrester predicts that 
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PROPORTION OF SMAlL BUSINESSES WITH ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 
Current IDteraet 
Access 
At:c~" by mid '96 
Acc:eH by end -s& 
ACCU$ plenned 
eventually 
No plans for access 
(.cUU 
e••tones> Oo.i. 10~ 20-.£ 30.. 40.. 50.. 60'1 70'1 80% 
Figure 12: Small Business Access Source: O'Reilly 1996 
96,076 medium companies and 640,962 small companies will connect to the Internet by 
the year 2000 (Eicher and Modahl, ·1995). Further, ActivMedia predicts that the number 
of companies using the Web as a commercial medium will grow eight and a halftimes in 
1996. They forcast an additional growth of four times in 1997 and doubling in 1998 
(ActivMedia, 1996). Commercial presence on the Web may be growing, but only a small 
percentage of these companies currently offer consumers the ability to conduct financial 
transactions online. IDC found that fewer than 5% of the 284 Fortune 500 companies 
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Figure 13: Projected Business Growth 
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with a Web presence offer financial transactions (Gens, 1996). However, the mere 
growth of companies online suggests the importance and potential of this medium. The 
medium contains millions of unvalued or unmeasurable interactions. The value of 
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customer e-mail feedback, catalog requests, or five minutes online looking at a car's 
details will be realized off-line in the physical economy (Eicher and Modahl, 1995). 
The CommerceNet/Nielson survey found that 14% of Web users have purchased 
products or services over the Internet. They estimate this number to be 2.5 million people 
(Massoto, 1995). Global Concepts conducted a survey commissioned by MasterCard 
International, Visa International, and Verifone Inc. which found that 32% of respondents 
have made purchases over the Internet (Global Concepts, 1996). The study also found 
that 96.1% said they were aware of online shopping, and 90.7% indicated they will likely 
make a purchase in the future. Global concepts surveyed over 450 Internet users. They 
also used focus group participants in Atlanta and San Francisco (Global Concepts, 1996). 
Forrester Research estimates that $2.2 billion in revenue were directly attributable to 
Internet activity in 1995 (Eicher and Modahl, 1995). Forrester's market sectors include: 
computers, communications, publishing, retail, information services, entertainment, and 
financial services. The largest sector, by far, is access provided by commercial online 
services, with $1.5 billion in revenues during 1995 (Eicher and modahl, 1995). Forrester 
estimates retail sales on the Web of$350 million in 1995. Forrester predicts that retail 
sales will reach $6.9 billion by the year 2000. The predicted growth in retail sales is 
displayed in Figure 14. Forrester further predicts that total Internet-related activity will 
grow to $45.8 billion by the year 2000 (Eicher and Modahl, 1995). Additionally, the 
study found that $46.2 billion of financial assets will be managed on the Internet. Self-
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service oriented customers will manage $29.9 billion of mutual fund assets and $16.3 
billion in deposits online (Eicher and Modahl, 1995). 
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Source: Forrester Research 
Figure 14: Projected Retail Sales 
ActivMedia conducted a market study in 1995. The study focused on businesses 
generating sales on the Internet. They identified businesses with active Web sites and 
selected a "statistically significant and relevant research panel" (ActivMedia, 1996) by 
including only those companies whose products and services flowed through the Internet 
pipeline, and excluding those that only feed the pipeline or do not participate 
commercially. The study took place in two parts. An initial questionnaire was sent to 
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2500 marketers that matched the product category distribution of the yahoo directory, 
with the exception of Web consultants and Web service providers, who were excluded 
from the sample. The initial mailing generated 1 000 responses. The second 
questionnaire included proprietary sales and export questions. This questionnaire was 
mailed to the same 2500 companies and received 231 responses. ActivMedia matched 
and cross tabulated the information from the two questionnaires (ActivMedia, 1996). 
The study found that sales generated by the Web reached $436 million in 1995. 
ActivMedia predicts that sales will grow to $46 billion by 1998 (ActivMedia, 1996). The 
study estimates that two percent of serious Web marketers account for over half of Web 
sales dollars (ActivMedia, 1996). The study found that the U.S. dominates Web 
commerce, but that by 1998 the U.S. share is expected to fall to 70%, with increases in 
Canada, Asia, and Australia. 
ActivMedia's study also questioned the success of Web sites. They found that nearly 
a quarter of the ActivMedia panel reported that they had financially successful sites 
(ActivMedia, 1996). Figure 15 illustrates the survey breakdown. ActivMedia reports 
that many of the businesses that responded to the survey had been active on the Web for 
less than seven months. The study found that an additional 40% of survey respondents 
predicted that their Web site would be profitable in 12 to 24 months (ActivMedia, 1996). 
The table below shows the breakdown of sales by sector. ActivMedia found that the 










Profitable in 12~24 Months 
Figure 15: Profitable Businesses 
Dollar Volume 1995 
Real estate 





Source: ActivMedia 1996 
Unit Volume 1995 
Software 
Audio/consumer electronics 
Computers and accessories 
Other consumer products 
Travel 
Financial services 
The preceding two surveys did not consider revenues generated by advertising when 
calculating Internet-related revenues. Advertising is a growing industry. ActivMedia 
estimates that there is nearly one Web advertising company for every seven Web 
marketers (ActivMedia, 1996). Advertising placement ofthe Web is where an advertiser 
pays a Web site for the privilege of displaying a banner or logo on one of the Web pages. 
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The banner is usually linked to the advertiser's site to generate traffic for the advertiser 
(WebTrack, 1996). 
WebTrack conducted research to determine the size of the Internet advertising market 
and the major players. Web Track examined 176 Web sites which actively solicit 
advertising and identified 1 02 which have charged advertisers in order to display their 
banners. Web Track then identified the advertisers which were advertising on the Web 
sites and assessed the rates which they were paying (Web Track, 1996). WebTrack was 
able to identify over 250 active Web advertisers with media budgets for electronic 
advertising ranging from $5000 to over $500,000. There were 33 advertisers who 
committed $100,000 or more (WebTrack, 1996). 
WebTrack research indicates that fourth quarter 1995 placement expenditure totaled 
$12.4 million (WebTrack, 1996). The top 15 advertisers accounted for $4.2 million 
(34%) ofthe total as illustrated in the table below (WebTrack, 1996): 
Big Advertisers Dominate Spending 
Top 15 34% 
6th to 30th largest 17% 
Others* 49% 
*240 advertisers 
Source: (WebTrack, 1996) 
The top Web advertisers in the fourth quarter 1995 are listed in the table below: 
Top WWW Advertisers 04 1995 
1. AT&T 
2. Netscape 
3. Internet Shopping Network 













11. Silicon Graphics 
12. Home Arts 
13. Honda 
14. Music Boulevard 
15. Sprint 











The study found that over a third of all Internet advertising is generated by other Internet 
providers, and more than half of the advertising is computer-related. The heaviest users 
of advertising services on the Internet are computer companies or others in the high-tech 
business (Satran, 1995). 
Corporations which have popular Web sites have learned it is possible to charge 
thousands of dollars per month to companies wishing to place advertisements on their 
sites. GNN charges $7500 per week to place a pointer to a company page on its hot list 
(Roche, 1995). Silicon Graphics pays Hot Wired magazine $15,000 per month to have a 
direct link to its home page. Netscape Communications is charging $40,000 for a three-
month placement on its Web site (Roche, 1995). Internet advertising is still a drop in the 
bucket compared with the $170 billion spent on all media (Satran, 1995). However, Alex 
Brown & Co. estimates it will jump to $1.4 billion by 1998 (Satran, 1995). Jupiter 
Communications estimates a growth to $5 billion by the year 2000. Jupiter further 
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predicts that advertising will have established itself as the leading source of revenues on 
the Internet by end of 1996 (Jaffee, 1996). 
34 
IV. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IMPEDIMENTS 
A. SECURITY 
Security of financial transactions on the Web is a primary concern of online buyers. 
The Hermes WWW user survey found that 60% of the users cite security concerns as the 
primary reason for not buying merchandise on the Web (Gupta, 1996). Yankelovich 
Partners found in another survey that 68% of online users do not feel comfortable about 
using their credit cards on the Web. Yankelovich Partners interviewed 400 online users 
and found that 90% said better Internet security is needed to ensure their personal or 
financial information is not accessible to unauthorized people (Jaffee, 1996). Further, the 
Y ankelovich survey found that 79% of the respondents agreed that it is too easy for 
someone to steal their credit card number if they use it on the Web (Jaffee, 1996). The 
following table compiled from USA Today shows where users place their trust: 
Where Personal Computer Users Place Their Trust 
ATM's 77% 
Banking by phone 62% 
Banking by computer 57% 
Using credit card at a public phone 57% 
Writing a credit card number on a catalog order 43% 
Sending credit card data to a commercial online service 34% 
Giving credit card number over phone 31% 
Sending credit card number over Internet 5% 
Source: (USA Today, 1995) 
Credit card losses cost banks and merchants about $1.5 billion in the U.S. and $3 
billion worldwide in 1995 (Lunt, 1996). MasterCard International reports that credit card 
35 
fraud represents less than 9/1 OOths of one percent of worldwide sales volwne (Lisker, 
1996). The National Fraud Information Center in Washington, D.C., typically handles 
350 cases of credit card fraud a day. In March 1996, 20 to 30 of these daily cases 
involved Internet transactions (Lunt, 1996). Forrester Research estimates that Internet 
commerce fraud is $1 for every $1000 worth of transactions. Comparable figures are 
$1.41 for credit card transactions, $16 for long-distance telephone calls, and $19.83 for 
cellular telephone service (Faulkner, 1996). Business Week reports that online fraud is 
insignificant compared to ordinary check fraud. The American Bankers Association 
estimates that check fraud costs banks $10 billion a year, while online fraud is running at 
0.05% of check fraud or $5 million a year (Business Week, 1995). 
Most retailers use a network technology called frame relay to transfer credit card 
information to financial institutions. Its characteristics are almost identical to the Internet 
network. A frame relay network is a public, packet switched, routable protocol like the 
Internet. The nwnber of credit card transactions flowing across these frame relay 
networks dwarfs anything on the Internet. The cash register or Verifone machine actually 
sends your credit card information across the network twice, once to authorize the 
nwnber, and once to create the final transaction (Dahl, 1995). The information is sent 
over the phone line at a speed of 1200 baud in clear ASCII (Busch, 1996). 
The conswner is protected even if their credit card nwnber is intercepted. In 1975, 
Congress passed the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA). Although not specifically designed 
for Internet related card fraud, it provides all the protection afforded conventional 
transactions. The maximwn liability for unauthorized use of a conswner credit card is 
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$50. This fee is often waived by the financial institution for good customers (Grossman, 
1996). 
Tony Rutkowski states that Internet experts view the risk of sending a credit card 
number unencrypted over the Internet as no greater than giving it over the telephone. 
Mike Homer points out that Netscape has been conducting business online for over a 
year. They have had over eight million customers and not a single report of any 
customers' information being stolen (Grossman, 1996). Further, Forrester Research 
interviewed 50 electronic retailers and content providers. They found that the widespread 
perception of an unsafe Internet holds back electronic commerce. Interviewees said that 
security concerns online were a media myth. The interviewees stated that they have not 
experienced thieves hacking into their systems or snatching customers card numbers off 
the Internet. Many retailers encouraged consumers to pay online (Forrester, 1996). 
B. REPORTED SECURITY BREECHES 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Computer Security Institute conducted a 
survey of corporate security officers, data security officers, and senior systems analysts. 
The survey group sent out 4971 questionnaires and received 428 responses. The survey 
found that 40% of the corporate, university, and government sites that responded reported 
at least one unauthorized use of their computers within the last 12 months (O'Conner, 
1996). Over 50% ofthose who experienced intrusions traced them to on-board 
employees. The survey found that 46.9% of users first tried patching their security 
breaches, while 26.6% immediately reported intrusions to law enforcement agencies. 
More than 16% of respondents did not report incidents (Power, 1996). 
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The 1995 Internet Security Survey was also conducted by the Computer Security 
Institute. This survey revealed that one out of every five Internet sites has suffered a 
security breach. The study found that nearly 40% oflnternet sites do not have firewalls 
in place. The survey also found that 30% of security breaches occurred after a firewall 
was installed. The study estimates that firewall sales will grow 70% from $1.1 billion in 
1995 to $16.2 billion in 2000 (CSI, 1996). 
Although security breaches are rarely reported, two of the most publicized involve 
Netscape Communications Corporation. The first of these was a challenge issued by 
Netscape to decrypt a message which was encrypted using the RC4 algorithm and a 40-
bit session key (See Appendix A). A French researcher working at INRIA was able to 
decrypt the message using a brute force attack. He used 120 workstations and two 
parallel supercomputers at three major research centers for eight days to break the 
message (Netscape, 1996). Netscape points out that the SSL protocol (Appendix A) was 
never compromised. Netscape estimates that $10,000 worth of computer power was used 
to break this single message and says that using RC4 40-bit is strong enough to protect 
consumer-level credit card transactions, since the cost of decrypting the message is high 
enough to make it not worth the computer time required to do so (Netscape, 1996). 
Through reverse engineering two graduate students from the University of California 
at Berkeley discovered a security flaw in the Netscape Navigator browser. Goldberg and 
Wagner discovered that the process used by Netscape Navigator to generate random 
number codes was vulnerable. The two students were able to write a program that was 
able to predict, in a matter of minutes, session keys produced by the random number 
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generator (Husum, 1996). Netscape Navigator uses random information to generate 
session encryption keys of 40 or 128-bit length (Appendix A). The random information 
is found through a variety of functions that look into a user's machine for information 
such as number of processes running, process ID numbers, and the current date and time. 
The vulnerability the students found exists because the size of random input is less than 
the size of the subsequent keys (Husum, 1996). 
Netscape fixed the problem by increasing the amount of random information used to 
generate keys. Chatterjee explained that the key space used will increase from 30-bits to 
300-bits. He also points out that the flaw did not affect the SSL protocol or encryption 
algorithms used by Netscape (Husum, 1996). He explains that the problem was on the 
implementation end ofNetscape Navigator. Netscape has offered a challenge and $1,000 
reward for anyone who can infiltrate the updated system. There has been no successful 
attempt (Lynch, 1996). 
Citibank was victim of the first reported case of electronic bank fraud in the United 
States. Vladimir Levin, a 28 year old mathematics graduate working for a trading 
company in St. Petersburg, Russia, was able to penetrate Citibank's cash management 
system over 40 times in five months (Times ofLondon, 1995). According to the FBI, 
Levin obtained $400,000 from the accounts of three banks, two Argentinean and one 
Indonesian. Citibank's cash management system allows Citibank customers to initiate 
their own funds transfers to other banks; daily turnover is about $500 billion (Flohr, 
1995). A further $11.6 million was illegally transferred after Citibank called in the FBI, 
who asked that the transfers be allowed to take place so they could trace the hackers. The 
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money was transferred to accounts held by a Russian in California and to other Russian-
held bank accounts in six other countries, including Israel, Germany, Holland, and 
Switzerland. Citibank officials say only the first $400,000 was lost. Levin was 
apprehended at Stansted airport in England after leaving St. Petersburg (Times of 
London, 1995). 
Citibank uses IRE security products. Seven of the ten largest banks in the U.S. also 
use IRE products. The company has supplied encryption devices to the U.S. National 
Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. Leukhardt explains that Citibank made the use of strong security measures 
optional for customers and that Levin and his accomplices exploited the fact that some 
end-users were only using conventional J.D.'s and passwords (EDI News, 1996). 
Kevin Mitnick is a 31 year old computer programmer who had been on the run since 
1992 for violation of a prior computer fraud probation order. Mitnick was arrested in 
Raleigh, North Carolina on February 15, 1995 for computer fraud. He had allegedly 
pilfered thousands of data files and at least 20,000 credit card numbers from Netcom 
Communications, an Internet service provider based in San Jose, California (NY Times, 
1995). This is the sixth time Kevin Mitnick was arrested for computer fraud. It took the 
efforts of security expert Tsutomu Shimomura, MCI, Sprint, Netcom Communications, 
and the FBI to apprehend Mitnick (NY Times, 1995). Mitnick has been awaiting trial for 
over 18 months while awaiting the conclusion of FBI investigations. He has only been 
charged with cellular telephone fraud and a probation violation. There has been no 
accusation of credit card fraud (Stone, 1996). 
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C. CUSTOMER INTERFACE BARRIERS 
Roy Bunyan ofiCL Financial Services claims that the risk of fraud is not the main 
obstacle to the progress of commerce on the Internet. He says that a lot of money is 
being spent on security, when the real barriers are access and speed. Bunyan says that it 
takes longer to perform comparative shopping on the Internet than it does to pick up the 
telephone and order the same item in a catalog (Wilson, 1996). He claims that as the 
Internet grows the problem will get worse. Bunyan says that the future lies in developing 
smart browsers which understand shopping habits and learn constantly. He believes this 
will enable less data input for the consumer each time they shop, leading to a more 
efficient shopping experience (Wilson, 1996). Bunyan envisions a smart agent or third 
party broker who will search the Web for your product input and provide the product 
information requested (Wilson, 1996). 
Hoffman agrees that online dynamic content directories must be developed to keep 
pace with the growing Web. She feels that efficient ways to help consumers sort and 
search through the vast offerings will be critical (Hoffman et al., 1996). Research in 
consumer decision making suggests that decision effectiveness degrades in the presence 
oftoo much information (Hoffman et al., 1996). Therefore, the challenge for marketers 
will be to develop, in conjunction with consumers, rule-based systems for the 
organization of content that exploit the principles of network navigation and facilitate 
flow (Hoffman et al., 1996). 
The organization of the Web site itself can be critical. The Hermes survey found that 
the most widely cited problem with using the Web was that it takes too long to 
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view/download pages (69.1 %). This problem is supported by the finding that 33.7% of 
the users report using 14.4 kbs modem and 26.6% use a 28.8 kbs modem (Gupta, 1996). 
ActivMedia's survey also found that Web sites with expensive graphics often restrict 
sales. They found that these sites attract a lot of users who not only do not buy, but also 
interfere with real buyer's access and the company's ability to serve those buyers 
(ActivMedia, 1995). Further, the Hermes survey found that 34.5% of users were unable 
to find a Web page they knew exists. Other problem areas identified by users was 25.8% 
not being able to organize the pages and information they gather and 23.7% not being 
able to find a page once visited (Gupta, 1996). 
Another barrier to electronic commerce is a lack of Web sites that offer transactions 
online. A recent study of Fortune 500 companies found that while nearly 80% ofthe 
companies are expected to have a Web presence by the end of 1996, less than 5% of these 
offer core business transactions online (Gens, 1996). IDC believes that although a 
relatively small number of companies offer core business transactions, the early adopters 
will quickly drive competitors to follow suit (Gens, 1996). 
Lack of sites that consumers view as superior to the conventional marketing channels 
is holding back the Web. The Web needs sites which deliver exceptional value to 
consumers and make it convenient for finding and buying goods (Chen, 1996). 
Broadvision (See Chapter 6) feels that one-to-one marketing is the answer. The driving 
principle of one-to-one marketing is getting to know your customer better. A 
collaborative dialogue is established. The objective is owning a piece of the customer's 
mindshare and providing personalized services addressable to each customer according to 
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their preferences (Broadvision, 1996). The company can then forge long-term 
relationships with loyal customers, responding to and even anticipating their personalized 
needs (Chen, 1996). Once the customer is known, the company can track their patterns of 
activity over time. This idea is not new, but what is different is the ability to tailor a 
message to the consumer while they are connected online, engaged in a live two-way 
medium. Chen says that the once the dialogue starts, the software will learn by observing 
consumer choices and subsequently provide more focused information, entertainment, 
and transactional capabilities to the individual consumer. Chen believes it is the capacity 
to learn, remember, and personalize that will draw consumers back to a Web site (Chen, 
1996). 
D. COSTS TO BUSINESSES 
Startup costs to businesses can be an impediment regardless of the projected rate of 
return advertised. Terry Fletcher estimates the startup cost of advertising on someone 
else's Web site to be nearly $6000. He estimates $2800 for development of layout, 
concept, and model page, $400 for analysis of competitors, $400 for programming of the 
Web page, $650 for programming of interactive forms, $975 for graphics, $810 for 
submitting pages to various Internet yellow pages, and $200 for updates per page per time 
(Fletcher, 1996). Fletcher estimates the startup costs for developing a commercial site to 
be $100,000. He figures a minimum of four machines are needed (Web server, file 
server, news server, and mail server), but ten machines are preferred to handle user load. 
He quotes the Sun or Hewlett Packard workstations at $5000 plus an additional $5000 for 
a binary license for each machine. Fletcher estimates annual disbursements to be 
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$78,000. The disbursements are broken down as follows: $2000 monthly for unlimited 
traffic volume, $1000 per month for the T1 net connection, $500 per month for telephone 
lines, and $300 per month utility bill for each workstation, monitor, and printer (Fletcher, 
1996). 
International Data Corporation surveyed medium to large-sized corporations 
maintaining the largest and most sophisticated interactive commerce channels on the 
Web. The study of corporate Internet application development discovered that the cost of 
establishing an interactive commerce business channel is four times greater than 
expected, and twice as much time is spent on customizing sites as anticipated (Connect, 
1996). The study revealed that while 20% of Web site development costs are spent on 
hardware and off-the-shelf software, 80% is spent on custom software development and 
integration (Connect, 1996). Respondents indicated they spent from $840,000 per site 
with minimal security, to more than $1.5 million for highly -secured sites (Connect, 
1996). ActivMedia estimated Web site development expenditures at $116.3 million and 




A. ANONYMOUS CREDIT CARDS I INTERNET MERCANTILE PROTOCOL 
Introduction 
Electronic communications networks bring consumers, merchants and fmancial 
institutions together and provide for electronic commerce transactions. The objective, 
however of anonymous credit cards and anonymous internet mercantile protocol (AIMP) 
is to keep information apart to protect personal privacy. AT&T Bell Laboratories have 
proposed a simple standard cryptographic system to accomplish this task. The credit card 
application separates the consumer's identity and purchases in order to protect that 
individual's privacy. Information delivery returned to the customer is also kept 
anonymous (K.ristol, 1994). The organization that extends credit needs to know a 
person's identity and the store knows the purchases, but no single entity knows both 
(Low, 1994). Therefore, the organization extending the credit does not have access to 
specific purchases, and the merchant is paid without knowing the consumer's identity. 
Functionality 
The credit card company uses a different bank to set up an anonymous account, which 
the individual uses when purchasing. As a purchase is being made, funds are transferred 
from the anonymous account to the merchant's account. The only distinction between 
anonymous credit cards and AIMP is that AIMP can be used on the Internet to perform 
anonymous funds transfer (Kristol, 1994). 
Other credit card company functions need to continue as users expect an itemized 
45 
billing statement to be able to challenge purchases, and to be notified if their card is being 
used in an unusual manner. These responsibilities remain with the credit card company. 
Double-locked Box 
A double-locked box protocol is used to transfer funds between accounts in order to 
make the system more difficult to break (Low, 1994). An intermediary known as a 
communications exchange (ex) acts as an electronic Federal Reserve to settle accounts 
among banks and to log messages to create an audit trail. The intermediary is used to 
conceal information so that neither bank knows the identity of the other, and only the 
bank maintaining the anonymous account knows the transactions occurring. The user 
deposits a box in the source account that can only be opened by the intermediary. Inside 
this box is the name of the destination bank, and a second box that can only be opened by 
that bank. The second box contains the name ofthe account (Low, 1994). 
Cryptographic Tools and Protocol Specifications 
Cryptographic Tools 
Public key cryptography is used for encryption and digital signatures (Appendix A). 
Each player in the system maintains a public and private key. The public key is known 
but the private key is only known by its owner. Authentication of each player is 
accomplished via digital signature as the transaction message arrives at a destination. 
The message consists of a time stamp sent in the clear, followed by a function of the 
message and the time stamp encrypted with the private key of the player (Low, 1994). 
Protocol Specifications 
The protocol achieves three objectives (Kristol, 1994): 
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(1) The seller's interest is protected by transferring funds to the seller's account before 
information/merchandise delivery. Furthermore, the information is encrypted so that it is 
useless to all but the paying customer. 
(2) The customer's anonymity is guaranteed by the use of information separation and 
cryptographic techniques. 
(3) The customer's interest is protected by the creation of a complete (but encrypted) 
audit trail that can be unraveled when necessary to settle any dispute. 
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Figure 18: Transfer ofBilling Information 
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Collusion 
Collusion is the combining of information using the communications exchange (ex) 
in order to perform financial electronic transactions. When two parties have a common, 
unique piece of information, they can combine their information (Low, 1994). The 
ability to extract information by collusion may make funds transfer mechanism more 
acceptable as anonymous accounts are currently illegal in the United States and there is 
concern about anonymous mechanisms being used for illegal reasons (Low, 1994). 
Collusion can be forced as sort of an "electronic equivalent of a subpoena" to determine a 
person's identity and purchases. The number of different parties that must collude to 
associate a person's identity and purchases is five. No single player has enough 
information to link customers to merchandise (Low, 1994). 
Conclusion 
Computing and data storage are becoming less expensive paralleling an increased use 
of credit and debit cards (Low, 1994 ). This allows profiles of consumers to be assembled 
and sold. Therefore it is possible to determine how much alcohol or tobacco you 
purchase or even which videos you rent with this information being readily available. 
Cash solves the problem only if you are not reluctant to carry it at all times. This 
protocol allows people to preserve their privacy in the conventional market place and on 
the Internet without losing the advantages associated with credit cards. The disadvantage 
is that fees are required to maintain an anonymous bank account and the communication 
exchange (intermediary). The anonymous credit card and AIMP protocol applications are 
49 
in the development process and not yet available. 
B. FIRST VIRTUAL GREEN COMMERCE MODEL 
Introduction 
The green commerce model proposed by First Virtual Holdings requires an Internet 
user to establish a cardholder account which is associated with a user's bankcard or 
checking account. The cardholder account is identified by a 12 digit alphanumeric string 
(First Virtual PIN assigned by FV) which is unique to a particular user (Gable, 1996). No 
bankcard or checking account numbers are used. The First Virtual system (green 
commerce server located in Austin, Texas) confirms each transaction and initiates 
settlement off-line through a conventional, secure link to processing agents, banks and 
credit cards (Gable, 1996). The green commerce server maintains all cardholder accounts 
and is responsible for funds transfer. Cardholder FV PINs (card numbers) are stored 
unencrypted in a separate computer system (FV customer service telcon 1996). 
Associated with each cardholder account is (Stein, 1995): 
(1) Internet electronic mail address 
(2) State (active, seller-only, suspended or invalid) 
(3) Pay-in method (i.e. bankcard) 
(4) Pay-out method (i.e. direct deposit into a checking account) 
(5) Type of currency (i.e. U.S., Canadian) 
The cards are bi-directional. A cardholder may engage in commerce as both a buyer or a 
merchant. The terms buyer and merchant only indicate the direction of the funds transfer 
for a transaction (Stein, 1995). 
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Green Commerce Model Transactions 
The green commerce model provides cardholders with eight possible transactions. 
The transactions are exchanges of messages between cardholders and the green 
commerce server (Stein, 1995). 
1. Funds Transfer 
The transaction occurs when one cardholder (merchant) requests funds from another 
cardholder (buyer). The buyer initiates a purchase using their card number (FV PIN). A 
transfer request message is sent to the green commerce server. The message contains the 
merchant and buyer card numbers, the transfer type (sale of information), and the transfer 
amount and currency ($1.00 U.S.). The green commerce server sends a transfer query 
message to the electronic mail address associated with the buyer's account (Stein, 1995). 
The transfer query message contains a transaction identifier uniquely generated by the 
server, the merchant and buyer names, the transfer type, and amount and currency 
associated with the buyer's account. The green commerce server waits for a response. If 
there is no response after a pre-determined number of days or number of transfer query 
messages are exceeded, the buyer's card number enters a suspended state. The card 
number will return to an active state once the number of transfer query messages for the 
buyer drops to less than a certain threshold. 
The buyer sends a transfer response message. The transfer response message contains 
the server's transaction identifier and the buyer's response (yes, no, or fraud). The green 
commerce server sends a transfer result message to the merchant's electronic mail 
address associated with the merchant's account. The transfer result message contains the 
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server's transaction identifier, the merchant and buyer names, the transfer type, and the 
buyer's permission to transfer the amount in the currency associated with the buyer's 
account. If the buyer indicated "yes", then the transaction is added to the green 
commerce server's settlement queue for the buyer. If the buyer indicated "no", then a 
service charge may be added to the green commerce server's settlement queue for the 
buyer. If the buyer indicates "fraud", then the associated card number enters the invalid 
state (Stein, 1995). 
The green commerce server periodically checks the settlement queue for each 
cardholder. A batch of accumulated transactions will be placed into a conventional, 
secure transaction every 91 days using the pay-in/pay-out method associated with the 
cardholder's account (FV customer service telcon, 1996). Ifthe pay-in/pay-out method 
fails, then the card number enters a suspended state and the green commerce server sends 
a pay-in/pay-out failure notification message to the associated electronic mail address. 
The pay-in/pay-out failure message contains the server's transaction identifier and the 
amount and currency associated with the transaction. If the funds transfer succeeds, the 
green commerce server sends a pay-in/pay-out notification message to the associated 
electronic mail address. The pay-in/pay-out message contains the cardholder's name, the 
pay-in/pay-out amount and currency type, the list of accumulated transactions and a 
service charge if applicable (Stein, 1995). 
2. Card Number Inquiries 
The card number inquiry transaction occurs when one cardholder wishes to obtain the 
state of another cardholder's account. A cardholder acting as a merchant may inquire 
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when considering a sale to another cardholder. The merchant sends an inquiry request 
message containing the buyer card number to the green commerce server. The green 
commerce server replies with an inquiry result message containing the buyer card number 
and the state associated with the cardholder's account to the electronic mail address of the 
merchant (Stein, 1995). 
3. Transfer Inquiries 
The transfer inquiry transaction occurs when a cardholder wishes to obtain the status 
of a funds transfer. Typically a merchant wants to find out the last action taken by the 
green commerce server. The merchant sends a status request message containing the 
merchant's card number and the transaction identification number to the green commerce 
server. The green commerce server replies with a status result message containing the 
merchant's card number and information about the last message sent by the green 
commerce server with respect to this transaction. The result message will indicate that it 
is either waiting for a transfer response message or the transaction has been placed into 
the settlement queue (Stein, 1995). 
4. Chargebacks 
The chargeback transaction occurs when a real-world funds transfer associated with a 
previous pay-in notification message results in a chargeback. A cardholder using a 
bankcard disputes a charge from the green commerce server after the server generates a 
real-world transaction. The green commerce server sends a pay-in chargeback 
notification containing the notification identifier associated with the pay-in method, the 
pay-in amount, and currency type to the associated electronic mail address. A pay-out 
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chargeback notification is also sent to the merchant's electronic mail address with the 
same information (Stein, 1995). 
5. Server Capabilities 
The server capabilities transaction occurs when a cardholder inquires about the 
capabilities of the green commerce server. The cardholder sends a capabilities request 
message containing the card number to the green commerce server. The green commerce 
server replies with a capabilities result message containing a list of supported transaction 
types (funds transfer, card number inquiries, transfer inquiries, chargebacks, server 
capabilities, cardholder applications, account maintenance, and account history) and a list 
of supported currencies (Stein, 1995). 
6. Cardholder Applications 
The cardholder applications transaction occurs when an Internet user applies for the 
green commerce cardholder account. The applicant sends an application request message 
via electronic mail to the green commerce server. The green commerce server sends an 
application result message containing a set of cardholder parameters to be filled in by the 
user. The user fills in the required information and sends the request back to the green 
·commerce server. The green commerce server replies with a new account result message 
containing the status of the application and the card number assigned to the applicant 
(Stein, 1995). 
7. Account Maintenance 
The account maintenance transaction occurs when a cardholder wants to change 
account information. The cardholder sends a change request message containing the card 
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number to the green commerce server. The green commerce server replies with a change 
result message containing the card number and information to be filled in by the user. 
The cardholder fills in the information and sends a change account request message to the 
green commerce server. The green commerce server sends a change account query 
message containing a transaction identifier uniquely generated by the server and a list of 
attributes to be changed to the associated electronic mail address. The green commerce 
server waits for a response. If the cardholder responds, then a change account message 
containing the server's transaction identifier and the cardholder's response (yes, no or 
fraud) is sent to the green commerce server. If the cardholder indicated "yes", then the 
green commerce server sends a change account result message containing the server's 
transaction identifier and a list of attributes to be changed to the associated electronic 
mail address. If the cardholder indicated "no", then no action is taken. If the cardholder 
indicated "fraud" then the cardholder's card number enters the invalid state (Stein, 1995). 
8. Account History 
The account history transaction occurs when a cardholder wants a history of message 
activity. The cardholder sends a history request message containing the associated card 
number to the green commerce server. The green commerce server responds by sending 
a "multipart/mixed" message containing recent messages sent to the cardholder by the 
green commerce server to the associated electronic mail address (Stein, 1995). 
Conclusion 
The merchant carries all risk of non-payment. The key security issue surrounds the 
transfer response message sent by the cardholder acting in the buyer role. The transfer 
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response message contains the uniquely generated transaction identifier in the transfer 
query message which is sent to the cardholder acting in the buyer role. The transaction 
identifier does increase security. However, it does not minimize the likelihood that 
electronic mail is intercepted. Electronic mail can be intercepted if a sniffer program is 
used to search for key words. Merchants selling goods instead of information are 
discouraged from using First Virtual because payment is not received until 91 days after 
the transaction (FV customer service tel con, 1996). First Virtual uses this tactic to deter 
chargebacks since purchases after three months increase customer expense (FV customer 
service telcon, 1996). Cryptographic applications would provide protection from 
interception and manipulation of the transfer response message. There are several secure 
e-mail applications for added security: PEM, S-MIME (RSA), PGP. 
Advantages of First Virtual Green Commerce Model: 
(1) Simple 
(2) Off-line conventional financial transactions 
Disadvantages: 
(1) Buying through e-mail message which can be intercepted and manipulated. 
(2) Transaction identification can be intercepted and manipulated. 
(3) Slow: No advantage of instantaneous transaction for the compulsive buyer. 
(4) Payment does not reach a merchant's account for 91 days. 
C. GSS-API FOR WEB SECURITY 
Introduction 
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) is under 
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development by the Internet Engineering Task Force Common Authentication 
Technology Working Group. The IETF goal is to provide a standard programming 
interface that Web applications can use to secure transactions over the Internet 
(Rosenthal, 1995). As with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), the GSS-API can be used to 
secure other applications in addition to the Web (Netscape, 1996). 
Web Functionality and Integration 
IETF is defining a negotiation protocol to enable GSS-API -based applications to 
negotiate and select common security mechanisms at run-time (Rosenthal, 1995). The 
protocol will provide for the interoperability of Web applications across a variety of 
security environments by allowing a Web client and server to support GSS-API 
mechanisms. The GSS-API can be incorporated into a variety of client/server application 
protocols (including HTTP). The integration occurs at the network communications level 
providing security for various types of HTTP transactions (Rosenthal, 1995). 
The definition of a new secure HTTP URL type is part of the Web/GSS-API 
integration. The URL type demonstrates that the Web data must be accessed using a 
GSS-API mechanism. A chosen security method must be used to enable the client to 
secure its request to the server. GSS-API implementations that support GSS-API 
mechanism negotiation, a common security mechanism type and mechanism options are 
selected via the mechanism negotiation protocol (Rosenthal, 1995). A security context 
using the selected mechanism is established. Web applications that only support a single 
GSS-API mechanism default to the common security program between the client and the 
server. It also goes to the common security program if an error is returned in the 
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negotiation process (Rosenthal, 1995). 
Acquiring Credentials and Security Context Establishment 
Credentials are required for security context establishment. Acquiring credentials 
makes available the relevant credential data for the client and server to be authenticated 
via the subsequent context establishment (Rosenthal, 1995). Credentials have a useful 
life and can be re-used until expiration. When credentials expire, they must be re-
acquired. Clients and servers may have different expirations depending upon the level of 
security. The acquisition process is varied depending upon the GSS-API mechanism 
being used. One or more mechanism-specific (non GSS-API) functions must typically be 
called prior to acquiring credentials (Rosenthal, 1995). Rosenthal provides example 
credential data: 
(1) Kerberos tickets 
(2) Private/Public Key Pairs 
(3) Public Key Certificates 
The process of security context establishment provides for authentication of the client 
and the server and establishes a secret key for Web transaction protection. The Web 
client initiates the security context, and the Web server accepts the security context 
(Rosenthal, 1995). 
Initiating and Accepting a Security Context 
The Web client initiates a security context using the GSS_Init_sec_context() function, 
passing the following as input arguments (Rosenthal, 1995): 
(1) The credentials (public/private certificates) returned from GSS_Acquire_cred(), or 
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null to use default credentials. 
(2) The name ofthe server. 
(3) A security mechanism type (selected during the negotiation process). 
( 4) A set of context-quality flags (indicate the quality parameters associated with the 
security context as conveyed by the client). 
The server name is used by the underlying GSS-API mechanism to obtain the 
appropriate server credential information needed to authenticate the client with the server 
(Rosenthal, 1995). Additional information is required to interpret the URL in 
environments where multiple authentications exist. If mechanism negotiation is 
supported, the mutual/anonymous authentication procedures are set as per the mechanism 
type and mechanism options selected during the mechanism negotiation phase 
(Rosenthal, 1995). Ifthe server is configured for authentication, then mutual 
authentication will be required during the mechanism negotiation process. Mutual 
authentication is not required when the server is not configured for authentication. 
The Web server accepts a security context using the accept security context function, 
passing the following as input arguments (Rosenthal, 1995): 
(1) The credential handle returned from the acquire credential function, or null to use 
default credentials. 
(2) The context token received from the client. 
If successful, the accept security context function returns the following as output 
arguments (Rosenthal, 1995): 
(1) The name of the client user. 
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(2) A set of context-quality flags. 
(3) Message protection service flags (indicate whether message confidentiality and/or 
integrity services are available for the context). 
The returned client name represents the authenticated identity of the user. The external 
representation of the authenticated user name can be used to enforce access controls on 
client requests (Rosenthal, 1995). If acceptance does not occur, the server disconnects 
from the client. 
Message Protection 
GSS-API functions are used to exchange information between the Web client and 
server in a secure manner once the security context is established. Transactions can be 
secured by a Message Integrity Code (MIC) alone, or by a MIC with public key 
encryption (Appendix A) of the transaction data (Rosenthal, 1995). Digital signatures 
can be used to ensure the integrity of the entire transaction. 
After the security context is established, the server enforces the level of security 
required for a transaction and sends the client a message that is secured at that enforced 
level. The server indicates to the client whether integrity alone or integrity with 
encryption is required and which integrity/encryption algorithm(s) must be used. The 
server also indicates the key size to be used for encryption (Rosenthal, 1995). The 
security level and type that is indicated by the server must agree with that supported by 
the GSS-API mechanism being used. If the mechanism support is not present, or the 
message transactions are not protected in the same manner as was originally indicated by 
the server, the server disconnects from the client (Rosenthal, 1995). 
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Conclusion 
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) does not define a 
network or a wire protocol. However, it can be used for securing financial transactions 
over the internet in accordance with the IETF requirements for Web security. GSS-API 
enables client and server authentication and data encryption capabilities to be 
incorporated into Web browsers in a secure and independent manner. GSS-API provides 
a generic programming interface which can be layered above different security 
mechanisms. The programming interface provides security services supporting a range of 
underlying mechanisms and technologies in different security environments (Linn, 1996). 
This is a move by IETF to standardize and promote both electronic commerce and open 
systems. 
D. IBM INTERNET KEYED PAYMENT PROTOCOLS (iKP) 
Introduction 
IBM Research Division has developed a family of secure multi-party payment 
protocols called Internet Keyed Payment Protocols (iKP). Designed to work on any 
browser, iKP technology (based on RSA public-key cryptography) allows customers to 
order goods, services, or information over the Internet, while relying on existing credit 
card or ATM networks to implement the necessary payments (Wayner, 1996). iKP 
electronic payment transaction may involve one, two, or three public keys. The bank 
acquiring the transaction for processing will have a public-private key pair for receiving 
confidential information (credit card numbers and signing authorization messages). 
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iKP Protocol Participants 
The iKP protocols are designed to allow buyers to order goods, services, or 
information over the Internet while relying on existing secure financial networks to 
implement the necessary payments. The iKP protocol provides complete cryptographic 
protection and a solid audit trail that can be used to resolve any disputes (Wayner, 1996). 
Participants in the iKP protocol are (Linehan, 1995): 
(I) Buyer and Seller 
(2) Seller's Bank and Buyer's Bank 
The seller's bank functions as a gateway between the internet and existing financial 
networks that support transactions between banks. The seller's bank maps the iKP 
protocol conducted on the Internet to the protocols used on the financial networks. iKP 
requires no changes in the communication between the buyer's bank and the seller's 
bank. Secure financial networks already exist to connect fmancial institutions (banks) 
therefore, iKP is not concerned with bank security issues. iKP is specifically designed to 
address security issues that arise in buyer and seller communications. 
iKP Protocol Description 
iKP may be used with a variety of communications channels (ie. SSL, HTTP, 
SHTTP, electronic mail). The general architecture accommodates a variety of payment 
methods by making certain message flows and fields optional. Prior to any iKP 
transaction, the buyer and seller must have already agreed on the details of the purchase 
order, the price and currency, and the payment method. Three iKP protocol scenarios 
exist and represent different levels of security (Wayner, 1996): 
62 
The lowest level, 1KP, requires that a central authority publish a certificate 
guaranteeing its public key (Appendix A). A large scale public key infrastructure is not 
required since public key certificates do not need to be issued to everyone. The customer· 
making a purchase encrypts the credit card number, the expiration date, and a secure hash 
of the information about price and details of the transaction. The merchant then adds its 
own secure hash of the transaction details to the customer encrypted information. The 
bank decrypts the customer's information and verifies both the customer's hash and the 
merchant's hash. Once verified, the bank signs this approval or rejection and the secure 
hash of the transaction details with its own digital signature. The customer and the 
merchant can also verify the bank's digital signature (Wayner, 1996). 
Customer 
2. Transaction details and 
encrypted credit card info 
using bank's public key. 
Figure 19: 1KP Protocol 
1. Cost, transaction details 
and bank's certificate. 
Merchant 
3. Details from 2 passed 
along with merchant's 
version of transaction. 
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4. Confirmation signed by 
bank's public key. Optional 
receipt for customer. 
(Digital signature) 
Bank 
The next level requires each merchant to publish a public key that is certified by a 
central authority (Appendix A). Each merchant uses a certified public key pair and adds 
its signature to the packet containing the customer's encrypted transaction details. The 
customer can verify this certificate and know that the merchant is approved by the bank 
(Wayner, 1996). 
Customer 
2. Transaction details and 
encrypted credit card info 
using bank's public key. 
Figure 20: 2KP Protocol 
I. Cost, transaction details 
and bank's certificate. 
3. Details from 2 passed 
along with merchant's 
version of transaction. 
(Digital signature) 
4. Confirmation signed by 
bank's public key. Optional 
receipt for customer. 
(Digital signature) 
The final level, 3KP, requires public key certificates to be issued to all customers 
(Appendix A). All three parties use digital certificates adding more security to the 
transaction. The customer is required to sign the encrypted transaction details providing 




2. Transaction details and 
encrypted credit card info 
using bank's public key. 
(Digital Signature) 
Figure 21: 3KP Protocol 
Protocol Options 
I. Cost, transaction details 
and bank's certificate. 
3. Details from 2 passed 
along with merchant's 
version of transaction. 
(Digital signature) 
4. Confirmation signed by 
bank's public key. Optional 
receipt for customer. 
(Digital signature) 
Bank 
The iKP protocol provides for transaction options which are available to multiple 
sellers for the purpose of browsing and comparative shopping. The following transaction 
options are (Tsudik, 1996): 
(1) SIG_B- Buyer's signature in the "PAYMENT" and "AUTH-REQUEST" mode. This 
option is at the discretion of the buyer the seller can refuse to issue an "INVOICE" if it is 
the seller's policy to always require an signature and the buyer is not able to provide it. 
{2) SIG_S- Seller's signature in the "INVOICE" mode. This option is set by the buyer. 
However, the seller can refuse to comply if the buyer is not ready to pay. 
(3) CONFIRM- Indicates that a "CONFIRM" is requested. This option is set by the 
buyer. 
(4) SIG_A- Set by the buyer, this is option is used in conjunction with the "CONFIRM" 
option. 
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(5) CLRN- Authorization and clearance are performed together. This is set by the seller. 
iKP Encryption 
Use of encryption in the iKP protocol is limited to protecting the buyer's personal 
identification number (PIN) and buyer account number. RSA public key encryption is 
used to accomplish this (Appendix A). 
Refunds 
The buyer and seller need to run iKP using a negative amount, effectively crediting 
rather than debiting money to the buyer's account. The seller and the bank may require 
that the "CONFIRM" message from a purchase be associated with any refund. This will 
ensure that the transaction was valid and permits the seller to verify the original purchase 
transaction total (Tsudik, 1996). 
Security Considerations 
Public-key signature mechanisms are critically dependent upon the security ofthe 
corresponding private keys. iKP requires private and public keys of banks and optionally 
of sellers and buyers. iKP requires that public keys are distributed via certificates signed 
by well known certification authorities (Appendix A). 
Conclusion 
iKP is the electronic equivalent of the paper charge slip, signature and submission 
process. iKP takes input from the negotiation process (payment amount, order 
description, payment method) and causes the payment to happen via a three-way 
communication among the buyer, seller and the bank. The data required by iKP in the 
buyer's system are the bank's public key, the seller's public key, the buyer's account 
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number, the buyer's public/private key pair, the buyer's personnel identification number 
(PIN), payment amount and currency, and the decryption of the order. The data required 
by iKP in the seller system are the bank's public key, seller's identification, seller's 
identification, seller's public/private key, payment amount and currency, and the 
description of the order. The IBM iKP protocols is an attempt to standardize the 
mechanism and the semantics for secure multi-party payments throughout the world on 
the World Wide Web. 
E. SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION (SET) PROTOCOL 
Introduction 
Visa and MasterCard reported on February 1, 1996 (Visa and MasterCard press 
release, 1996) that they have been cooperating on a standard for the use of encryption 
technology for electronic payments on the Internet known as Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET). Visa was allied with Microsoft Corp. and MasterCard with 
International Business Machines Corp. and Netscape Communications. Now they have 
come together to create SET as a standard on the World Wide Web for secure financial 
transactions (Evans, 1996). 
Public key technology and symmetric algorithms are combined to ensure authentic 
and private electronic payments. Cryptographic algorithms and digital signatures using 
RSA technology are the tools which make the SET protocol secure and authentic. The 
SET protocol uses these tools to (SET draft, 1996): 
( 1) Provide confidentiality of information 
(2) Ensure payment integrity 
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(3) Authenticate both merchants and cardholders 
SET Technological Tools 
The tools to a safe electronic shopping experience as specified by SET are digital 
certificates, public key encryption and digital signatures. 
Digital Certificates 
Digital certificates represent the heart of secure electronic transactions. Digital 
certificates provide an easy and convenient way to ensure that the participants in an 
electronic commerce transaction can trust each other. This trust is established through a 
common third party (Visa or MasterCard). Each party's SET compliant software 
validates both merchant and cardholder before any information is exchanged. The 
validation takes place by checking the digital certificates which were both issued by an 
authorized trusted third party (SET draft, 1996). Digital certificates ensure that all 
computers talking to each other can successfully conduct electronic commerce. The basis 
for this technology is public key encryption. 
Public Key Encryption 
Please see appendix A for public key encryption description. 
Digital Signature 
Digital signatures provides a method to associate the message with the sender. This 
authenticates the electronic purchase/payment transaction. SET uses these cryptographic 
techniques to provide information confidentiality, ensure payment integrity and 
authenticate both merchants and cardholders. Digital information security comprises all 
of these technologies to prevent the unauthorized disclosure, alteration or removal of 
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information while controlling access of information moving across networks (SET draft, 
1996). 
SET Methodology 
Cardholders must register their credit card directly on-line with their bank prior to any 
electronic purchases. The SET software provides a registration form on your PC screen 
with basic information (name, card account number, card expiration date, billing 
address). Once transmitted, this information is encrypted and securely sent to the 
computers of your credit card issuing financial institution. The bank will check to ensure 
the credit card account is authentic. The bank then issues an electronic certificate putting 
its digital signature on your digital certificate. The certificate is stored on your PC for 
future use. Similarly, merchants have to register to participate in secure shopping. The 
merchant's bank issues them a digital certificate allowing them to conduct electronic 
commerce. 
The SET protocol uses three basic steps to protect credit card transactions from 
unauthorized use (SET draft, 1996). 
(1) Before a customer sends a credit card number over the Internet, the personal computer 
scrambles it using Data Encryption Standard technology (Appendix A). The scrambled 
number is intended to be unintelligible to other Internet users even the merchant making 
the electronic sale. 
(2) A special code lets the merchant check with the bank that issued the credit card, to 
confirm the validity of the number and the name of the credit card user. 
(3) When the merchant gets the authorization from the bank, the sale goes through 
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without the merchant ever knowing the credit card number. 
Conclusion 
Visa and MasterCard jointly developed the Secure Electronic Transactions (SET) 
protocol as a method to secure bankcard transactions over the Internet. SET uses public 
key cryptography for confidentiality, payment integrity, authentication and 
nonrepudiation which are critical to both the customer and the merchant. SET is the 
standard for Visa and MasterCard to bring consumers and merchants together for secure 
electronic commerce. 
F. SECURE HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL (S-HTTP) 
Introduction 
S-HTTP (Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol) is a simple extension to the normal 
HTTP that was first proposed in Internet Draft in June of 1994 by Rescorla and 
Schiffman. The latest version (1.1) emerged in December of 1994 (Wayner, 1996). S-
HTTP provides independently applicable security services for transaction confidentiality, 
authenticity/integrity and non-repudiability of origin (Rescorla, 1995). Current HTTP 
applications do not have the necessary support for cryptographic mechanisms appropriate 
for conducting commercial transactions. 
S-HTTP provides secure communications between HTTP client/server allowing such 
transactions to be used for a wide range of applications. S-HTTP supports a variety of 
security mechanisms providing symmetric capabilities to both client and server while 
preserving the transaction model and implementation characteristics of the current HTTP 
(Rescorla, 1995). Cryptographic message formats such as PKCS-7, PEM and PGP 
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support interoperation. S-HTTP supports "end-to-end" secure transactions in contrast 
with the existing HTTP mechanisms. Therefore, sensitive data do not need to be sent 
over the network in the clear (Rescorla, 1995). 
Modes of Operation 
The S-HTTP standard allows the traffic to and from the server to be either signed, 
encrypted, or authenticated in any combination (Wayner, 1996): 
(1) Signature - If the digital signature enhancement is applied, an appropriate certificate 
may either be attached to the message or the sender may expect the recipient to obtain the 
required certificate independently. 
(2) Encryption - Bulk encryption is supported by S-HTTP defines two key transfer 
mechanisms. The first method is public key (Appendix A) and another with externally 
arranged keys. In the former case, the symmetric key cryptosystem parameter is passed 
encrypted under the receiver's public key. In the latter mode, the content is encrypted 
using a prearranged session key, with key identification information specified on one of 
the header lines. 
(3) Authentication-S-HTTP provides a means to verify sender authenticity and message 
integrity. Authentication is accomplished by using a hash function which provides a 
message digest (Appendix A). The message digest is then encrypted with a key and sent. 
This mechanism is useful in cases where it is appropriate to allow parties to identify each 
other reliably in a transaction without providing third-party non-repudiability for the 
transactions themselves. This mechanism is motivated by the idea that the action of 
"signing" a transaction should be explicit and conscious for the user, whereas many 
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authentication needs (access control) can be met with a lighter-weight mechanism that 
retains the scalability advantages ofpublic-key cryptography (Rescorla, 1995). 
HTTP Encapsulation 
A secure HTTP message consists of a request or status line followed by a series of 
style headers and encapsulated content. When the content is decoded, it will be either 
another secure HTTP message, an HTTP message, or simple data. The request or status 
line, when accepted, will be considered non-coding and clients will substitute the URL of 
the request when communicating. Secure style header lines will be treated as case 
insensitive unless otherwise specified (Rescorla, 1995). The terminal encapsulated 
content message is largely dependent upon the values of the content privacy domain and 
content transfer encoding fields. Once the privacy enhancements have been removed, the 
contents will be a normal HTTP request. Alternatively, the content may be another 
secure HTTP request, which privacy enhancements will be unwrapped until clear content 
is obtained (Rescorla, 1995). 
Message Format Options 
PKCS-7 
PKCS-7 (Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard) is a cryptographic message 
encapsulation format, similar to PEM, which was defined by RSA Laboratories as part of 
a family of related standards. The PKCS standards are offered by RSA to developers of 
computer systems employing public key cryptography. PKCS-7 is one of three 
encapsulation formats supported by S-HTTP, but it is preferred because it permits the 
least restricted set of negotiable options, and permits binary encoding. PKCS-7 is a 
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superset of PEM, in that PEM messages can be converted to PKCS-7 messages without 
any cryptographic operations, and vice-versa and their key management materials 
(certificates) are also compatible (Rescorla, 1995). 
Messages may be either signed, encrypted, both or neither. Appropriate certificates 
must be attached to digital signature messages. A certificate signed with the private 
component corresponding to the public component is referred to as a self-signed 
certificate. A purely signed message is precisely PKCS-7 compliant (Rescorla, 1995). 
Encryption using either a public key or a prearranged key is accomplished using PKCS-7. 
A message using PKCS-7 encryption may or may not be signed. While generating 
signed, encrypted data, it is necessary to generate the signed data production prior to 
encryption (Rescorla, 1995). 
PEMIPGP 
PEM (Privacy-Enhanced Electronic Mail) and PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) both use 
RSA encryption. RSA encryption provides integrity, data origin authenticity, and 
optionally, confidentiality (Kent, 1996). The only problem that PEMIPGP has had is that 
the messages are not time stamped. This means that a malicious user could record your 
encrypted message with a packet sniffer and repeat it back to the server. Even though the 
reply would be unreadable, if the request was something for which you were being 
charged, a large bill may be waiting for you at the end of the month (Rescorla, 1995). 
Negotiation and Negotiation Headers 
All parties communicating need to be able to negotiate which cryptographic method 
to use. The appropriate option choices will depend on implementation capabilities and 
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the requirements of particular applications. A negotiation block is a sequence of 
specifications each conforming to a four-part schema detailing (Rescorla, 1995): 
(1) Property - The option being negotiated (ie. bulk encryption algorithm). 
(2) Value - The value being discussed for the property (ie. DES-CBC). 
(3) Direction- The direction which is to be affected (ie. during reception or origination). 
(4) Strength- Strength of preference (ie. required, optional, refused). 
An example of a negotiation header (Rescorla, 199 5): 
STTP-Symmetric-Content-Algorithms: recv-optional=DES-CBC, RC4 
S-HTTP -Privacy-Domains 
New header lines are defined as necessary to permit negotiation of the application 
choices. All negotiation headers can be considered to apply to all privacy domains 
(message formats) or to a particular one. When specifying negotiation parameters which 
apply to all domains, the header lines need to be provided before any privacy-domain 
specifier. Negotiation headers which follow a privacy-domain header are considered to 
apply only to that domain. Multiple privacy-domain headers specifying the same privacy 
domain are permitted, in order to support multiple parameter combinations (Rescorla, 
1995). 
Security Retries for S-HTTP Requests 
A request that is unsatisfactory for the reason of incorrect cryptographic 
enhancements may be repeated with the options found in the negotiation header. This 
method can be used to force a new public key negotiation if the session key in use has 
expired. The server may also require the client to retry the request using another set of 
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cryptographic options. The client will perform the retry in the manner indicated by the 
combination of the original request, the precise nature of the error, and the cryptographic 
enhancements depending on the options the server requires (Rescorla, 1995). Automatic 
retries are rarely used due to potential compromise of encrypted information. 
Transaction Security Status 
A visual indication of the security of the transaction, and an indication of the party 
who will be able to read the message appear on the browser during secure message 
preparation. The browser will indicate the identity of the signer. Any failure to 
authenticate or decrypt an S-HTTP message will be presented differently from a failure to 
retrieve the document. This gives the client the option to display unverifiable documents 
(Rescorla, 1995). 
Conclusion 
Secure HTTP supports many security mechanisms providing security options for 
World Wide Web financial transactions. Traffic may either be signed, encrypted, or 
authenticated allowing nine different options in any combination (three for the client and 
three for the server). PKCS-7, PEM and PGP are cryptographic message format 
standards used to supportS-HTTP clients and servers. S-HTTP message integrity 
verification is message based. When a message is correctly received, all packets in the 
stream are received. Secure HTTP interacts with HTTP messages in many ways. The 
negotiation structure offers the flexibility allowing the S-HTTP protocol to be used for a 
number of encryption solutions. Message integrity is computed on the entire message. 
Performance boosting schemes based on packetizing messages and multiplexing them 
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over a single message stream is no longer required. No sensitive data will ever need to be 
sent over the World Wide Web in the clear with S-HTTP available. 
G. SECURE SOCKETS LAYER V3.0 - SSL 
Introduction 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL V3.0) is an open nonproprietary security protocol that 
provides communications privacy between application protocols over the Internet. This 
security protocol also provides data encryption, server authentication, message integrity, 
and optional client authentication for a TCPIIP connection. The protocol is composed of 
two layers. The layer below a reliable transport protocol is the SSL Record Protocol. 
The SSL Record Protocol encapsulates higher level protocols. One such protocol is the 
SSL Handshake protocol which allows the client and server to authenticate each other 
and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys before the application 
protocol transmits or receives its first byte of data (Freier, 1996). The SSL protocol has 
three basic properties: 
(1) The connection is private. Encryption is used after an initial handshake to define a 
secret key. Symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption. Examples are DES or 
RC4 (Appendix A). 
(2) Identity can be authenticated using asymmetric, or public key, cryptography. 
Examples are RSA or DSS (Appendix A). 
(3) The connection is reliable. Secure hash functions such as SHA or MD5 (Appendix A) 
are utilized (Freier, 1996). 
There is broad support for this protocol which will support interoperability between 
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products from many organizations. Apple Computer, Inc., Bank of America, 
ConnectSoft, Delphi Internet Services Corporation, Digital Equipment Corporation, First 
Data Corporation, IBM, MarketNet, MasterCard International Inc,. MCI Communications 
Corp., Microsoft Corporation, Novel Inc., Open Market, Prodigy, Silicon Graphics, Inc., 
StarNine, Sun Microsystems, Inc., Visa International, and Wells Fargo are among 
companies backing SSL (Netscape press release, 1996). 
SSL Protocol Technical Attributes 
SSL provides a security hands_hake during initiation of a TCPIIP connection. The 
handshake results in an agreement between client and server on the level of security that 
will be used. SSL requires servers to maintain certificates which are issued by a 
Certificate Authority (CA). Certificates verify the legitimacy of arbitrary servers 
(Appendix A). Thereafter, SSL is only providing encryption and decryption (DES or 
RC4) of the application protocol being used (Freier, 1996). 
SSL messages can include fields for length, description, and content. Since SSL is a 
layered protocol, the message fields are included at each layer. When the message is 
ready for transmission, SSL fragments the data into blocks, compresses the data if 
necessary, encrypts and transmits. Data received are then decrypted, verified, 
decompressed and reassembled before being delivered to higher level clients (Freier, 
1996). 
Session and Connection States 
The SSL session is stateful, which means that the protocol controls and coordinates 
the read and write states of both client and server. The protocol state machines are then 
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allowed to operate consistently, despite the fact that the state is not exactly parallel 
(Freier, 1996). The state is repeated twice, once during the current state and again during 
the handshake protocol. Additionally, separated read and write states are maintained. 
When the client or server receives a change cipher spec message, it copies the pending 
read state into the current read state. When the client or server sends a change cipher spec 
message, it copies the pending write state into the current write state (Freier, 1996). 
When the handshake negotiation is complete, the client and server exchange change 
cipher spec messages and they then communicate using the newly agreed upon cipher 
spec. An SSL session may include multiple secure connections; in addition, parties may 
have multiple simultaneous sessions (Freier, 1996). 
The session state includes the following elements (Freier, 1996): 
(1) Session Identifier- An arbitrary byte sequence chosen by the server to identify an 
active or resumable session state. 
(2) Peer Certificate- Certificate of the peer. This element of the state may be null. 
(3) Compression Method- The algorithm used to compress data prior to encryption. 
(4) Cipher Spec- Specifies the bulk data encryption algorithm such as null or DES 
(Appendix A) and a message authentication code (hash) algorithm such as MD5 or SHA 
(Appendix A). It also defines cryptographic attributes such as the hash size. 
(5) Master Secret- 48 byte secret shared between the client and server. 
( 6) Resumable - A flag indicating whether the session can be used to initiate new 
connections. 
The connection state includes the following elements (Freier, 1996): 
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(1) Server and Client Random- Byte sequences that are chosen by the server and client 
for each connection. 
(2) Server Write Hash Secret - The secret used in hash operations on data written by the 
server. 
(3) Client Write Hash Secret- The secret used in hash operations on data written by the 
client. 
(4) Server Write Key- The symmetric bulk cipher key for data encrypted by the server 
and decrypted by the client. 
(5) Client Write Key- The symmetric bulk cipher key for data encrypted by the client and 
decrypted by the server. 
(6) Initialization Vectors- When a symmetric block cipher in CBC mode (Appendix A) is 
used, an initialization vector (IV) is maintained for each key. This field is first initialized 
by the SSL handshake protocol. Thereafter the final ciphertext block from each record is 
preserved for use with the following record. 
(7) Sequence Numbers - Each party maintains separate sequence numbers for transmitted 
and received messages for each connection. When a party sends or receives a change 
cipher spec message, the appropriate sequence number is set to zero. 
Record Layer 
The SSL Record Layer receives uninterpreted data from higher layers in non-empty 
blocks of arbitrary size. The record layer fragments information blocks into SSLPlaintext 
records of2"14 bytes or less (Freier, 1996). Client message boundaries are not preserved 
in the record layer. Multiple client messages of the same Content type may be coalesced 
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into a single SSLPlaintext record. Data of different SSL Record layer content types may 
be used together. Application data is generally of lower precedence for transmission than 
other content types. 
Record Compression and Decompression 
All records are compressed using the compression algorithm defined in the current 
session state. There is always an active compression algorithm. However, initially it is 
defined as CompressionMethod.null (Freier, 1996). The SSLPlaintext is compressed into 
an SSLCompressed structure. Compression erases state information as the CipherSpec is 
replaced. Compression must be lossless and may not increase the content length by more 
than 1024 bytes (Freier, 1996). If the decompression function encounters an 
SSLCompressed.fragment that would decompress to a length in excess of2"14 bytes, it 
will issue an error alert. 
Handshake Protocol 
The SSL Handshake Protocol is one of the defined higher level clients of the SSL 
Record Protocol. This protocol is used to negotiate the secure attributes of a session. 
Handshake messages are supplied to the SSL Record Layer, where they are encapsulated 
within one or more SSLPlaintext structures, which are processed and transmitted as 
specified by the current active session state (Freier, 1996). The cryptographic parameters 
of the session state are produced by the SSL Handshake Protocol on top ofthe SSL 
Record Layer. When a SSL client and server first begin communicating, they agree on a 
protocol version, select cryptographic algorithms, optionally authenticate each other, and 
use public-key encryption (Appendix A) techniques to generate symmetric session keys. 
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The client sends a client hello message to which the server must respond with a server 
hello message, or else a fatal error will occur and the connection will fail. The client 
hello and server hello are used to establish security enhancement capabilities between 
client and server. The client hello and server hello establish the following attributes: 
Protocol Version, Session ID, Cipher Suite, and Compression Method (Freier, 1996). 
Following the hello messages, the server will send its certificate, if it is to be 
authenticated (Netscape, 1996). Additionally, a server key exchange message may be 
sent, if it is required. If the server is authenticated, it may request a certificate from the 
client. Now the server will send the server hello done message, indicating that the hello-
message phase of the handshake is complete (Freier, 1996). The server will then wait for 
a client response. If the server has sent a certificate request message, the client must send 
either the certificate message or a no certificate alert. The client key exchange message is 
now sent. The content of that message will depend on the public key algorithm selected 
between the client hello and the server hello. If the client has sent a certificate with 
signing ability, a digitally-signed certificate verify message is sent to verify the certificate 
(Netscape, 1996). 
When a change cipher spec message is sent by the client, the client copies the pending 
Cipher Spec into the current Cipher Spec. The client then immediately sends the finished 
messages using the new algorithms. In response, the server will send its own change 
cipher spec message, transfer the pending to the current Cipher Spec (Freier, 1996). The 
handshake is complete and the client and server may begin to exchange application layer 
data. 
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When the client and server decide to resume a previous session or duplicate an 
existing session Freier defines the message flow as follows: The client sends a 
ClientHello using the Session ID of the session to be resumed. The server then checks its 
session cache for a match. If a match is found, and the server is willing to re-establish the 
connection under the specified session state, it will send a Server Hello with the same 
Session ID value. Both client and server must send change cipher spec messages and 
proceed directly to finished messages. Once the re-establishment is complete, the client 
and server may begin to exchange application layer data. If a Session ID match is not 
found, the server generates a new Session ID and the SSL client and server perform a full 
handshake. 
Record Payload Protection and the CipherSpec 
All records are protected using the encryption and hash algorithms defined in the 
current CipherSpec. There is always an active CipherSpec. However, initially it is set to 
null, which does not provide any security (Freier, 1996). 
When the handshake is completed, the two parties communicating have shared the 
necessary secrets which are used to encrypt records and compute hash functions. The 
hash operations and techniques used to perform the encryption are defined by the 
CipherSpec (Freier, 1996). The encryption, decryption and-hash functions translate the 
SSLCompressed structure into SSLCiphertext and sequencing numbers. The sequencing 
numbers allow detection of missing or altered messages (Freier, 1996). 
Asymmetric Stream Cipher 
Stream ciphers (Appendix A) convert SSLCompressed fragment structures to and 
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from stream SSLCiphertext fragment structures (Freier, 1996). The hash is computed 
before encryption. The stream cipher encrypts the entire block, including the hash. 
Stream ciphers that do not use a synchronization vector such as RC4 (Appendix A), 
simply use the stream cipher state from the end of one record on the subsequent packet 
(Freier, 1996). 
CBC Block Cipher 
The encryption and hash functions convert SSLCompressed fragment structures to 
and from block SSLCiphertext fragment structures when using symmetric block ciphers 
(Appendix A). The initialization vector (IV) for the first record is provided by the 
handshake protocol when using CBC. The IV for subsequent records is the last 
ciphertext block from the previous record (Freier, 1996). 
Change Cipher Spec Protocol 
The change cipher spec protocol exists to signal transitions in ciphering strategies. 
The protocol consists of a single message, which is encrypted and compressed under the 
current CipherSpec. The change cipher spec message is sent by both the client and server 
to notify the receiving party that subsequent records will be protected under the newly 
negotiated CipherSpec and keys. Reception of this message causes the receiver to copy 
the read pending state into the read current state. The client sends a change cipher spec 
message following handshake key exchange and certificate verify messages and the 
server sends one after successfully processing the key exchange message it received from 
the client. An unexpected change cipher spec message should generate an unexpected 
message error alert (Freier, 1996). 
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Finished 
A finished message is always sent immediately after a change cipher specs message 
to verify that the key exchange and authentication processes were successful. The 
finished message is the first protected with the newly negotiated algorithms. No 
acknowledgment of the finished message is required. Parties may begin sending 
confidential data immediately after sending the finished message. Recipients of finished 
messages must verify that the contents are correct. The hash contained in finished 
messages sent by the server incorporate Sender.server; those sent by the client incorporate 
Sender. client (Freier, 1996). The value handshake messages includes all handshake 
messages starting at client hello up to, but not including the finished messages (Freier, 
1996). 
Alert Protocol 
One of the content types supported by the SSL Record layer is the alert type. Alert 
messages convey the severity of the message and a description of the alert. Immediate 
temiination may occur. However, other connections corresponding to the session may 
continue, but the session identifier must be invalidated, preventing the failed session from 
being used to establish new connections. Like other messages, alert messages are 
encrypted and compressed, as specified by the current connection state (Freier, 1996). 
Closure Alerts 
The client and the server must share knowledge that the connection is ending in order 
to avoid truncation. Either party may initiate the exchange of closing messages. A close 
notification is an example of a closure alert. This message notifies the recipient that the 
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sender will not end any more messages on this connection. The session becomes 
unresumable if any connection is terminated without proper notification messages with a 
level equal to the warning (Freier, 1996). 
Error Alerts 
Error handling in the SSL handshake protocol is fairly simple. As an error is 
detected, a message is sent to the other party. Upon transmission or receipt of a fatal alert 
message, both parties close the connection immediately. Clients and servers are required 
to delete any session identifiers, keys and secrets associated with the failed connection 
(Freier, 1996). 
Security Analysis 
The SSL protocol is designed to establish a secure connection between a client and a 
server communicating over an insecure channel. Assuming that attackers have 
substantial computational resources, they may have the ability to capture, modify, delete, 
replay, and tamper with messages sent over any communication channel (Netscape, 
1996). The handshake protocol is responsible for selecting a CipherSpec and generating 
a MasterSecret, which together comprise the primary cryptographic parameters associated 
with a secure session. The handshake protocol can also optionally authenticate parties 
who have certificates signed by a trusted certificate authority (Freier, 1996). 
RSA Key Exchange and Authentication 
RSA, Key exchange and server authentication are combined using RSA cryptography. 
The public key may be either contained in the server's certificate or may be a RSA 
session key (Appendix A). When RSA session keys are used, they are signed by the 
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server's RSA or DSS certificate. Servers may use a single RSA session key for multiple 
negotiation sessions. The server's certificate is the first verified, then the client encrypts 
a pre master secret with the server's public key (Freier, 1996). Successfully decoding the 
pre master secret and producing a correct fmished message allows the server to 
demonstrate that it knows the private key corresponding to the server certificate (Freier, 
1996). The client signs a value derived from the master secret and all preceding 
handshake messages. These handshake messages include the server certificate, which 
binds the signature to the server, and ServerHello.random, which binds the signature to 
the current handshake process (Freier, 1996). 
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange with Authentication 
When Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used, the server can either supply a certificate 
containing fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters or can send a set of temporary Diffie-
Hellman parameters signed with a DSS or RSA certificate. Temporary parameters are 
hashed with the hello.random values before signing to ensure that attackers do not replay 
old parameters (Freier, 1996). The client, in either case, can verify the ·certificate or 
signature to ensure that the parameters belong to the server. 
If the client has a certificate containing fixed Diffie-Hellman parameters, its 
certificate contains the information required to complete the key exchange. To prevent 
the pre master secret from staying in memory any longer than necessary, it should be 
converted into the master secret as soon as possible (Freier, 1996). Client Diffie-Hellman 
parameters must be compatible with those supplied by the server for the key exchange to 
work (Freier, 1996). 
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Fortezza 
Fortezza's design is classified, but at the protocol level it is similar to Diffie-Hellman 
with fixed public values contained in certificates. The result of the key exchange process 
is the token encryption key (TEK), which is used to wrap data encryption keys, client 
write key, server write key, and the master secret encryption key (Freier, 1996). The data 
encryption keys are not derived from the pre master secret because unwrapped keys are 
not accessible outside the token (Freier, 1996). The encrypted pre master secret is sent to 
the server in a client key exchange message (Freier, 1996). 
Detecting Attacks Against the Handshake Protocol 
An attacker might try to influence the handshake exchange to make the parties select 
different encryption algorithms than they would normally choose. Because many 
implementations will support 40-bit exportable encryption and some may even support 
null encryption or hash algorithms, this attack is of particular concern (Netscape, 1996). 
An attacker must actively change one or more handshake messages to invite this attack. 
If this occurs, the client and server will compute different hash values for the handshake 
messages. As a result, the parties will not accept each others' finished messages. 
Without the master secret, an attacker cannot repair the finished messages, so an attack 
will be discovered (Freier, 1996). 
Conclusion 
SSL can provide effective electronic communications security between parties 
providing the client and server systems, keys, and applications are secure and free from 
security errors. The system is only as strong as the weakest key exchange and 
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authentication algorithm supported, and only trustworthy cryptographic functions should 
be used. Short public keys, 40-bit bulk encryption keys, and anonymous servers should 
not be used. Implementations and users must be careful when deciding which certificates 
and certificate authorities are acceptable. 
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VI. FINANCIAL TRANSACTION SERVICE COMPANIES 
A. BROADVISION INC. 
Introduction 
BroadVision Inc. has developed a one-to-one application system for dynamic, 
personalized marketing and selling on the Internet. The one-to-one software product 
transforms static Web sites into interactive marketing communities by empowering 
business managers to create and deliver personalized services that save consumers time, 
effort, and money (Runge, 1996). Using the product's innovative Dynamic Command 
Center feature, marketing, advertising, and Web content manages can perform the 
following (Runge, 1996): 
(1) Personalize editorial content, advertising and incentive programs based on individual 
consumer demographics and usage patterns. 
(2) Observe consumer interactions in real time to identify and seize opportunities based 
on consumers' on-line activity. 
(3) Foster virtual communities by integrating electronic mail bulletin boards and on-line 
forums. 
(4) Establish collaborative on-line dialogues with customers to improve long-term 
satisfaction and retention. BroadVision Inc. was founded in May 1993 by Dr. Pehong 
Chen (Runge, 1996). 
Application System Architecture 
The application system offers a scalable three-tiered architecture permitting business 
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rules to be created and modified independent of application logic and data sources 
(Runge, 1996). This enables business managers to react fast to changing business 
conditions without compromising integrity of data and application logic. 
Security and External Business Systems 
BroadVision uses RSA cryptography to safeguard credit card numbers and transaction 
information. BroadVision one-to-one application can also be used with the Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol (BroadVision, 1996). BroadVision's open standards-based 
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) interfaces allow one-to-one 
applications to interoperate with any external business system (BroadVision, 1996). 
CyberCash and VeriFone Payment Support 
One-to-one supports CyberCash and VeriFone technologies for electronic payment of 
transactions conducted over the Internet. The CyberCash Secure Internet Payment 
System provides safe, convenient and immediate processing of transactions and 
authorization codes between consumers, merchants and their banks in real-time 
(BroadVision, 1996). VeriFone's Internet Transaction Switch provides a range of 
payment functions, including transaction switching and credit/debit authorization 
settlement support (BroadVision, 1996). 
Electronic Data Interchange (ED!) 
EDI provides an inexpensive, and secure forwarding of purchase orders, invoices, 
shipping notices, and other frequently used business documents between applications and 
computers (BroadVision, 1996). 
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Personalized Home Pages 
The one-to-one Web Content Development Tool is used to build page templates and 
content management can be defined and maintained in the Dynamic Command Center 
(BroadVision, 1996). Building page templates is similar to creating a traditional static 
Web page. One-to-one generates content dynamically based on business rules and 
personal aspects of the dialogue with the consumer. A unique Web page can be 




















BroadVision has developed a model for creating successful one-to-one on-line 
marketing and selling systems (BroadVision, 1996). 
(1) Attract and retain consumers by providing personalized and compelling content 
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couple with a sense of community relevant to them. 
(2) Engage consumers in personalized dialogue, learning more about their needs to better 
anticipate their future needs and requirements. 
(3) Motivate consumers by providing personalized incentives (i.e. coupons and ads) for 
them to move from dialogue to action such as ordering a product or completing a survey. 
(4) Fulfill transactions by reliably and securely supporting the full spectrum of electronic 
commerce from promotional pricing to secure payment handling. 
(5) Manage the process by monitoring results and allowing dynamic changes to business 
rules and content to ensure the system is achieving business goals. 
Conclusion 
The principal users of BroadVision one-to-one application are business people who 
research, design, redesign and run all business functions of a Web site (BroadVision, 
1996). Traditionally, business people have had to rely on computer programmers to 
implement marketing programs, selling models, and business rules using fairly 
complicated programming (Runge, 1996). BroadVision' s one-to-one application allows 
businesses to respond quickly to changes in the marketplace by easily changing Web site 
content and personalizing it for individual consumers. 
B. CONNECT INC. ONESERVER ORDERSTREAM 
Introduction 
Connect Inc., founded in 1987, is based in Mountain View, California. Connect is a 
provider oflnternet-based interactive commerce and order management applications for 
companies that want to use the Internet for electronic commerce (Strohecker, 1996). The 
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company also provides high-end software and services adding a decade of on-line 
experience (Strohecker, 1996). RSA Data Security, Inc. has teamed up with Connect Inc. 
and provides technology backing for Connect's electronic commerce secure OneServer 
OrderStream platform. 
OneServer Features 
OneServer can transparently access data in either the OneServer database or within 
external database systems. OneServer is the only Internet commerce server with three 
levels of security (Strohecker, 1996). 
(1) One Server applications platform compliments RSA encryption with internal access 
protection. 
(2) Connect provides technology controls to prohibit unauthorized access. 
(3) Connect's technology also limits authorized users to specific transactions. 
OneServer software is based on industry standard database and operating system 
technology providing businesses with functionality, maximum flexibility, scalability and 
manageability for electronic commerce applications (Strohecker, 1996). OneServer 
features include integrated dynamic data query and simplified page layout functions 
which allow businesses to provide access to large volumes of graphics and data 
(Strohecker, 1996). Therefore, products are more easily tracked and sold on-line and 
businesses can customize consumer interfaces. 
JICA (Java Interactive Commerce An.plet) 
The combination of Sun's Java programming language and Connect's OneServer 
software allows businesses to build experience of a trained salesperson, including the 
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salesperson's knowledge base of various products into an on-line Interactive Commerce 
application (Connect Press Release, 1996). Businesses can allow customers to access this 
electronic salesperson for an informative description of products on-line and apply it to 
purchases. 
Logica Multimedia Solution 
Logica Inc., founded in 1969, provides software and services to the finance, 
telecommunications, computing and electronic companies in more than 18 countries 
(Connect Press Release, 1996). Logica is in the process of developing large-scale 
interactive commerce applications based on the Connect OneServer software platform. 
Logica and Connect hope that this alliance will extend the reach of electronic commerce 
and provide a multimedia application allowing effective marketing of products and 
services worldwide. 
VeriSign Digital Certificates 
VeriSign augments OneServer security by electronically authenticating and issuing 
digital certificates for conducting business to business electronic financial transactions. 
Digital identification technology provides a trusted method of authenticating the identity 
of parties during electronic financial transactions (Connect Press Release, 1996). Digital 
certificates are issued by a trusted third party (i.e. VeriSign) that performs background 
checks on individuals or businesses. Public key cryptography techniques are used to bind 
the owner's unique digital key into a file that is digitally signed by the issuing agent 
(Appendix A). VeriSign signs its digital identifications with the longest encryption key 
sizes currently deployable in commercial applications (Strohecker, 1996). 
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OneServer OrderStream 
OrderStream is a complete, secure Internet application that streamlines and automates 
the sales channel for business to business distributors. OrderStream is built on the 
OneServer software platform and supports distribution of computers, software, 
electronics parts, office equipment and supplies (Connect Press Release, 1996). 
OrderStream allows distributors to take volume orders quickly and easily over the 
Internet enabling companies to maximize profits at lower costs. 
Conclusion 
OrderStream built on OneServer software architecture was introduced in September 
1995. OneServer is based on UNIX and the Internet. The platform supports all Web 
browsers and provides enhanced features for corporate developers who are customizing 
solutions for interactive commerce. 
C. CYBERCASH INC. 
Introduction 
CyberCash Inc. of Reston, Virginia, founded in August 1994 is a developer of 
software service solutions for secure electronic fmancial transactions over the Internet. 
The CyberCash system is designed to allow banks to offer secure Internet payments and 
micropayments to merchants. CyberCash works with all credit card processing 
institutions, enabling payments by credit card to be instantaneously processed (Claymon, 
1996). Electronic check and electronic coin services are expected to be released in late 
1996 (CyberCash Press Release, 1996). CyberCash system includes consumer software, 
merchant software, and gateway services. 
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CyberCash Functionality 
The foundations of the CyberCash system are encryption and digital signatures 
provided by RSA Data Security software (Wayner, 1996). The software operates on 
Microsoft Windows and will operate on Macintosh and UNIX platforms by late 1996 
(CyberCash Press Release, 1996). 
The basic credit card transactions are very similar in structure to the IBM iKP system. 
Customers set up accounts by downloading software from CyberCash and filling out an 
application form. The customers include the credit card numbers that they plan to use. 
CyberCash creates an individualized encrypted file for each customer that includes their 
credit card number and a public key that are assigned by CyberCash (Wayner, 1996). 
This preprocessing allows CyberCash the opportunity to ensure the credit card is valid 
with the issuing bank. 
CyberCash Credit Card Transaction 
The steps in CyberCash credit card transactions are (CyberCash, 1996): 
(1) A consumer has shopped the merchant's site ad and decides to make a purchase and 
where to ship merchandise. The merchant server returns the price of the item. 
(2) The consumer selects the "pay" button which sends the order and encrypted payment 
infornl.ation to the merchant. 
(3) The merchant receives the packet, strips off the order and forwards the encrypted 
payment information digitally signed and encrypted with his private key to the 
CyberCash server. The merchant cannot see the consumer's credit card information. 
(4) The CyberCash server receives the packet, takes the transaction behind its firewall 
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and off the Internet, unwraps the data, reformats the transaction and forwards it to the 
merchant's bank over dedicated lines. 
(5) The merchant's bank then forwards the authorization request to the issuing bank 
conventionally. The approval or denial code is sent back to CyberCash. 
( 6) CyberCash returns the approval or denial code to the merchant who passes it onto the 
consumer. Step one to step six takes 15- 20 seconds. 
Figure 23: CyberCash Secure Internet Credit Card Payment Transaction 
Conclusion 
CyberCash client software package is exportable and designed to negotiate firewalls. 
CyberCash has agreements with several merchants (Digital Equipment Corp., Sun 
Microsystems, First of Omaha Merchant Processing, CheckFree, National Data Corp., 
and Xerox) and two major banks (Bank of America and Wells Fargo). The major 
difference between the CyberCash system and IBM iKP protocol is the need for 
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certificates. CyberCash issues the public key pairs for all users and maintains certificate 
authority. 
D. FIRST VIRTUAL HOLDINGS INC. 
Introduction 
First Virtual Holdings Inc. introduced the world's first fully operational Internet 
payment and micropayment system in October 1994 (Gable, 1996). The company was 
created specifically to enable safe global buying and selling by anyone with access to the 
Internet. The system is electronic mail (e-mail) based that transfers money by passing e-
mail messages. The system is operated by a green commerce server located in Austin, 
Texas (Chapter V). The transactions are simple and straight forward. Both buyer and 
seller must have First Virtual accounts which are associated with conventional methods 
of deposits and payments. Checking and bankcard account numbers are never typed on a 
keyboard or sent over the Internet. 
The Concept 
The payment system accomplishes safe transactions without the need for Internet 
users to purchase or install additional software or equipment (Borenstein, 1995). Existing 
·e-mail technology is used without cryptography. E-mail call-backs provide security to all 
cardholders when their Virtual PIN is in use. Encryption is not used for the following 
reasons (Borenstein, 1995): 
(1) Encryption and signature technologies prevent most people from participating. 
(2) Encryption and signature technologies are complicated and confusing. 
(3) Encryption and signature technologies yield a false sense of security. 
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( 4) Encryption and signature technologies require the use of software and certification 
infrastructures that are not commonly available. 
(5) Encryption and signature technologies are restricted by patents, copyrights, and export 
restrictions. 
Becoming a Buyer 
Complete an application on the Internet and receive a Virtual PIN. Part of this 
process requires registration with a credit card over the telephone (FV Information, 
1996). A valid Visa or MasterCard and an Internet e-mail address are required. When 
making a purchase, provide the merchant the Virtual PIN. First Virtual's green 
commerce server will send an e-mail confirming the purchase and wait for the buyer's 
response (Chapter V). 
Becoming a Merchant 
Complete an application on the Internet and receive a Virtual PIN. A bank account 
that accepts direct deposit is required with a ten-dollar registration fee (FV Information, 
1996). Send an e-mail message containing the buyer's Virtual PIN and the amount of 
sale. The green commerce server confirms the transaction with the buyer and notifies the 
merchant via e-mail (Chapter V). 
Virtual PIN Security 
The green commerce server settles all buying-selling transactions off-line (Chapter 
V). Transactions are confirmed with buyers via e-mail before any charges are applied to 
a credit card. Credit card numbers are never typed on a keyboard. The Virtual PIN is the 
only number typed and sent over the Internet eliminating the need for encryption and 
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significantly reducing the potential for fraud (Borenstein, 1996). 
First Virtual Fees 
The cost to register with FV is two dollars for consumers and ten dollars for sellers. 
Sellers pay a 29-cent fee and two percent of the transaction price for each transaction. 
Sellers are also charged one dollar processing fee each time a payment is made to their 
bank account. (FV Information, 1996) 
Equity Partners 
(1) First USA Merchant Services, Inc., Dallas, Texas. 
(2) National Direct Marketing Corp. (NDMC), Arlington, Virginia. 
(3) Sybase, Inc. (Sybase), Emeryville, California. 
Strategic Alliances 
(1) Electronic Data Systems (EDS) 
(2) Network Computing Devices (NCD) 
(3) Spyglass, Inc. 
(4) Sun Microsystems Computer Corp. (SMCC) 
The Founders 
(1) Nathaniel S. Borenstein, Ph.D., chief scientist. 
(2) Marshall T. Rose, Ph.D., principal developer. 
(3) Einar A. Stefferud, MBA, founder. 
(4) Lee H. Stein, J.D., chairman and CEO. 
Conclusion 
First Virtual is a simple, safe, and conservative approach to Internet commerce. No 
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criminal has broken into the system and no flaws have been discovered in the first year of 
operation (Borenstein, 1996). Merchants are not attractive targets for criminals because 
they do not collect credit card numbers. Buyers do not have to obtain, install, and learn 
to use new software. No export or licensing restrictions are involved in the use of the 
system. However, credit card and bank account numbers are given over the telephone 
and e-mail messages can be intercepted and manipulated. 
E. NETSCAPE COMMERCE SERVER 
Introduction 
Netscape Communications Corp. based in Mountain View, California was founded in 
April1994 by Dr. James H. Clark, founder of Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Netscape Press 
Release, 1995). Netscape Communications have developed the Internet's first secure 
server, the Netscape Commerce Server, which incorporates the Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol (Chapter V). When paired with Netscape Navigator or other Internet 
navigators supporting SSL, the Netscape Commerce Server lets users take advantage of 
such commercial services as on-line publications, financial services and interactive 
shopping. The Netscape Commerce Server is high performance server software for 
conducting secure electronic commerce and communications on the Internet and other 
TCPIIP based networks. The server enables business on the Internet to gather customer 
feedback, conduct market research, and build extensive customer databases quickly and 
efficiently (Netscape, 1996). 
Integrated Security 
Advanced security features are provided using the SSL protocol (Chapter V). These 
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features are designed to enable secure electronic commerce and communications. 
Flexible user authorization controls access to individual files or directories using a 
usemame and password, domain name, host name, IP address, or named groups 
(Netscape, 1996). SSL provides (Chapter V): 
(1) Server authentication allowing any SSL compatible client to verify the identity of the 
server using a certificate and a digital signature. 
(2) Data encryption ensuring the privacy of client-server communications by encrypting 
the data stream between them. 
(3) Data integrity which verifies that the contents of a message arrive at their destination 
in the same form as they were sent. 
SSL employs public key cryptographic technology from RSA Data Security. The 
Netscape Commerce Server requires a signed digital certificate to operate securely 
(Netscape, 1996). 
N etscape Commerce Server Overview 
Netscape Commerce server allows hypermedia documents to be published using the 
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and deliver them over the Internet and other 
TCPIIP networks using the HyperText Transport Protocol (HTTP) (Netscape, 1996). 
Improved process and memory management enable Netscape Commerce Server to 
deliver unparalleled performance and reliability. Documents are delivered several times 
faster with a throughput several times higher than other available HTTP servers. The 
efficient process management features ofNetscape Commerce Server minimize system 
load and increase overall server reliability. (Netscape, 1996) 
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Server11anagement 
Netscape Commerce Server uses Netscape Navigator's graphical interface to provide 
a consistent, easy-to-use operating environment. The simple user interface and forms 
capability provide point and click server installation, configuration, and maintenance. 
Netscape Navigator and its forms capability for server management ensure a common 
look across all Netscape server products and enables secure remote configuration and 
management from any computer on the network. Forms are used for the initial server 
configuration managing all server functions including user authorization, transaction 
logging, and process configuration. (Netscape, 1996) 
Conclusion 
Organizations can rely on the Netscape Commerce Server to manage secure electronic 
financial transactions and communications across the Internet. SSL provides strong 
security to existing applications on the Internet incorporating RSA Data Security 
technology. Netscape is only producing U.S. version of the Netscape Commerce Server 
with the 128-bit RC4 (Appendix A) due to the current U.S. export laws (Netscape, 1996). 
The Netscape Commerce Server provides easy configurability and maintenance, full 
documentation and technical support. 
F. OPEN MARKET 
Introduction 
The Open 11arket (011) Web-based secure financial transaction system was 
developed by Open Market Inc. of Cambridge, MAin October 1994 (Wayner, 1996). 
OM first introduced Merchant Solution, a secure World-Wide Web server kit for 
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businesses that handles financial transaction, order taking and payments, credit card 
transactions, sales tax processing, and other purchasing and distribution tasks over the 
Internet (Bowen, 1995). The OM Secure Web Server is the only Web server on the 
market that supports both the SSL and the S-HTTP security protocols (Chapter V). The 
OM Secure Web Server does not need to create session keys, which come from the 
browser in the SSL mode (OM Press Release, 1996). The OM Secure Web Server creates 
session keys, in the S-HTTP mode (OM Press Release, 1996). The OM Secure Web 
Server is the world's fastest achieving 5,000 simultaneous 14.4 Kb modem connections 
(King, 1996). 
OM-SecureLink Executive 
The newest class of software that OM has produced to perform Secure Electronic 
Commerce is OM - SecureLink Executive (OM Press Release, 1996). This consists of 
OM- Transact which is a complete back-office transaction management infrastructure for 
secure Internet commerce and OM-Access which are server software that centrally 
manages access to corporate data distributed across the World Wide Web (Gifford, 1996). 
OM - SecureLink Executive provides the following (OM, 1996): 
(1) Change existing Website content into an online store. 
(2) Securely manage user access to distributed Web content across heterogeneous servers. 
(3) Track anonymous sessions and capture valuable information that will help manage 
Website content. 
OM- Transact 
OM - Transact enables companies to offer secure payment, complete order 
104 
management, and online customer service. OM - Transact will support Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI), purchase orders, and comprehensive reporting, in addition to SSL and 
S-HTTP (OM, 1996). OM- Transact is available to corporate users for a base price of 
$250,000 (OM, 1996). 
OM- Transact features are (OM, 1996): 
(1) Security: Keyed message authentication codes are used to ensure message integrity 
and secure payment protocols (SSL and S-HTTP). 
(2) Authentication: Provides access control for registered buyers. 
(3) Order Management: Securely accept orders using standard Web technologies. 
(4) Record Keeping: Online, real-time transaction records for merchants (audit trail). 
(5) Transaction Processing: Secure transaction and payment processing, automatically 
calculating shipping charges. 
(6) Customer Service: Online account statements and customer service providing order 
status. 
(7) Flexible Payment Model: Companies may offer products and services that can be paid 
in installments, subscription, or through a one-time charge. 
The steps in the OM -Transact Model are (OM, 1996): 
(1) Buyer requests a commerce enabled page 
(2) The merchant serves up content with digital offers which contain the signed offer of a 
good or service for sale. 
(3) The buyer selects on a digital offer to purchase an item. 
( 4) Service provider authorizes the purchase and settles charges. 
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(5) Service provider issues a digital receipt. 
(6) OM- SecureLink Executive validates the digital receipt and serves the requested 
content. 
(7) Service provider advises merchant ofbuyer's order. 
Merchant Server Merchant Bank 
6,2 7 4 
Buyer OM-Transact 
5 
Figure 24: OM - Transact Model 
OM- Transact allows merchants to sell goods and services directly from a Website. 
OM - SecureLink generates digital offers which contain unique keyed messages (hash). 
Prior to processing any orders, OM - Transact validates each hash. Merchants can be 
certain that goods and services are paid for when they are accessed from a Web site. 
Customers will receive a digital receipt that the OM - Transact generates validating their 
purchase. (OM, 1996) 
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OM-Access 
OM- Access is the server software designed to support a company's Web 
applications by centrally managing the authentication and authorization of end users. 
OM - Access solves information management problems by identifying users, controlling 
access to data by individual and group, measuring and reporting access to data across 
multi-vendor servers, providing Web access to existing corporate systems, and enabling 
new Web-based applications (OM, I996). 
OM- Access features are (OM, I996): 
(I) OM- Access includes OM Secure Web Server software and analysis software. 
(2) Flexible access to authorization databases through a published application 
programming interface (Chapter V). 
(3) Ability to manage content stored on servers other than Open Market's. 
(4) Secure control of access to information. 
( 5) Comprehensive auditing and reporting. 
( 6) Provides personalized content generation. 
The steps in the OM- Access Model are (OM, I996): 
(I) Browser requests information. 
(2) OM-SecureLink Executive denies access without a ticket. 
(3) OM-Access authenticates and authorizes user, then grants ticket. 
(4) OM-SecureLink Executive validates ticket and allows access. 








Figure 25: OM- Access Model 
OM - Access can restrict access to your sensitive company information even if that 
information is stored on distributed content servers. Users must have tickets known as 
session identifiers in order to gain access to an associated company. Authentication is 
required prior to users receipt of authorized tickets and access. (OM, 1996) 
Management 
(1) Shikhar Ghosh, Chairman 
(2) Gary Eichhorn, CEO 
(3) David Gifford, cofounder and chief scientific officer 
Conclusion 
The Open Market system is easy to access and use. The system is an excellent way to 
set up a storefront and operate in an integrated electronic commerce environment. OM 
and FV are almost exact opposites. The fundamental difference is the level of trust 
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(Wayner, 1996). FV allows people to try before they buy and OM is designed for real-
time transfer so payment is made before the information/goods are shipped. FV relies 
exclusively on electronic mail (e-mail) which can be slow. OM uses both SSL and S-
HTTP protocols for data security. 
Open Market offers free testing services and software to help Internet-based 
businesses and users protect themselves from potential security breaches. Open Market's 
Website includes a security checker so that users can test their browsers for reported 
security problems. 
G. SECUREWARE INC. 
Introduction 
Secure Ware Inc. has developed a Secure Web Platform to protect data and 
applications inside a company's own network. The security provided for network 
communications by Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(S-HTTP) (Chapter V), is effective (Secure Ware, 1995). However, it is not enough. 
Protection ends at the point where the Web server meets the Internet. Web servers and 
back-end systems are unprotected without Secure Web Platform. Secure Web Platform 
uses a three-part solution that protects data and applications from the browser to the back-
end (Secure Ware, 1995). 
(I) The SSL security protocol (Chapter V). 
(2) A secure operating system for the Web server provided by Secure Ware. 
(3) A comprehensive network security product for the internal network known as Hannah. 
109 
Hannah Network Security 
Hannah modifies the network software on the Secure Web Platform and on the 
internal systems with which it communicates. It restricts access to client and server 
applications on the internal network and protects data. Hannah intercepts connection 
attempts ensuring that a user is authorized for a network connection. Hannah intercepts 
all network traffic between the applications to protect data integrity and encrypt it if 
necessary. Hannah can restrict access to applications. It can also restrict access to critical 
machines or server hosts. (Secure Ware, 1995) 
Audit Trail 
The Secure Web Platform includes an audit trail mechanism built into the operating 
system. The system writes an audit record to an audit trail whenever a file is modified, a 
privilege used, an authorization granted, or an access to a file or other resources is denied 
(SecureWare, 1995). 
Secure Web Platform Models 
Most applications for the Secure Web Platform fit one of three models (Secure Ware, 
1995): 
(1) Networks which link Web servers to an application server and then to a back-end 
machine. 
(2) Networks which connect Web servers to an application server. 
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Figure 28: Model Three: Secure Web Platform's Self-Contained Support Application 
Conclusion 
The Secure Web Platform provides end-to-end security beginning at the Web 
browser. It incorporates the Netscape Commerce Server, providing SSL security protocol 
for client and server authentication and client-to-server encryption. The Hannah network 
security product authenticates administrators and other internal users, protects data and 
applications on the internal network and restricts access to the Web server machine and 
other production machines on the internal network. 
H. SOUTH FLORIDA MALL (TM) 
Introduction 
South Florida Mall (TM) is doing business on the Internet using the Internet 
Commerce Security Method. The Internet Commerce Security Method was developed by 
Shareware in 1995. Downloading and using the method commercially is $30. South 
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Florida Mall merchants use this method to receive payment for their products and 
services. Internet data can be available to a hacker by two methods (Bodley, 1995): 
(1) Intercepting data packets. 
(2) Computer break-in. 
South Florida Mall's Internet Commerce Security Method addresses both attacks without 
the use of standard encryption methods. 
Internet Commerce Security Method 
Consumers making a purchase on the Internet from the South Florida Mall do not 
send their entire credit card number over the net at once. The credit card number is 
divided into four groups of four digits (Bodley, 1995). The consumer chooses a four digit 
security code and enters it into the order form to be delivered separate from the credit 
card number. The two messages go to different addresses (i.e. One to the mall and one to 
the storefront). When the consumer enters the credit card number, simply add one of the 
security code digits to each of the four credit card number fields and the card number is 
transmitted in this altered state (Bodley, 1995). 
Example: 
Credit Card Number: 1234 5678 9012 3456 
Security Code: 1234 
Encoded Number to Send: 
First Field: 1234 + 1 = 1235 
Second Field: 5678 + 2 = 5680 
Third Field: 9012 + 3 = 9015 
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Fourth Field: 3456 + 4 = 3460 
Ensure the numbers in the four credit card number fields are correct and send. 
Conclusion 
South Florida Mall's position is that credit card use over the Internet is as safe as any 
other form of commerce (Bodley, 1995). Responsible consumers who use credit cards 
look at their monthly statements and object to charges they did not make. Responsible 
credit card banks also look for unusual activity and contact their customers if there is 
suspicious activity. Charge backs are common for illegally used credit card numbers that 
protect the consumer. The Internet Commerce Security Method is very simple. 
However, there is no protection against electronic mail interception of the encoded credit 
card number and the four digit security code. 
I. CHECK PAYMENT SYSTEMS 
1. CheckFree Corp. 
Introduction 
CheckFree Corp. based in Columbus, Ohio began in 1981. CheckFree is integrated 
with all major credit cards and the Federal Reserve Bank's electronic transfer network 
(Wayner, 1996). CheckFree markets its services to consumers who use CheckFree 
software to pay monthly bills and to corporations who need access to automated 
processing (CheckFree, 1996). CheckFree uses CyberCash technology to provide end-to-
end Internet payment services. CyberCash' s security integration allows CheckFree 
Wallet to create a single solution for electronic payment transactions that offers checks 
and credit cards (Sims, 1995). 
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The Concept 
The average consumer can use the CheckFree software for DOS, Windows, or 
MacOS machines to pay monthly bills. The subscription costs $5.95 for the first 20 
payments and $2.95 for each subsequent batch often payments (CheckFree, 1996). 
Paying bills using stamps is more expensive ($6.40 for 20 stamps). Actual transactions 
occur between bank accounts. The CheckFree application requires a voided check when 
opening a CheckFree account. Any money that is spent is deducted from that bank 
account as if a check was used. 
When making a purchase on the Internet, the merchant's name and address is typed in 
with the purchase amount. CheckFree's computers then determine the best way to pay 
the merchant. Three methods are used (CheckFree, 1996): 
(1) Electronic- CheckFree sends an electronic credit to your payee and electronically 
debits your checking account on your scheduled payment date. 
(2) Electronic-to-Check - Check.Free sends the payee a check. This check is drawn from 
Check.Free's account. Check.Free will then debit your checking account electronically on 
your scheduled payment date. 
(3) Laser Draft - Is just like a personal check. 
The consumer schedules the payment dates with the Check.Free software. Time limits are 
not much of an improvement over paper (Wayner, 1996). A transaction must be entered 
four business days before its effective date. A stop payment order must be issued five 
days in advance. The four day limit is set due to the possibility of a paper check being 
required if the merchant does not accept electronic transfers (Check.Free, 1996). 
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CheckFree Wallet 
CheckFree Wallet is an extension of the company's current links to the banking and 
credit card industry (Wayner, 1996). CheckFree Wallet was introduced in April1995 to 
allow consumers to purchase goods and services from on-line merchants. The CheckFree 
Wallet does not require prior registration with merchants and on-line shoppers pay no 
fees or transaction service charges (Sims, 1995). The addition of CyberCash' s 
technology provides consumers the ability to transmit credit card payments securely over 
the Internet, and merchants will receive authorization in real time. A password is used to 
open a consumer's CheckFree Wallet. The shipping and credit card information is 
protected by RSA Data Systems encryption which is used by CyberCash (CyberCash, 








Figure 29: CheckFree Wallet Purchase Transaction (CheckFree, 1996) 
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(1) A World Wide Web shopper views a CheckFree-Enabled Merchant on the Internet 
and selects items to purchase. The encrypted payment information is sent to the 
merchant. 
(2) The merchant adds information to the transaction and sends the encrypted transaction 
data to the CheckFree processing center. Upon receipt of payment authorization, an 
electronic receipt is created and sent to the consumer. 
(3) CheckFree decrypts the transaction information, authorizes the transaction, and 
returns an authorization code to the merchant. 
.. 
(4) CheckFree sends credit to the merchant's bank, debits the consumer's method of 
payment, and sends account receivable, balancing, and reconcilement reports to the 
merchant's bank. 
Conclusion 
The CheckFree system is largely used by consumers to pay bills. There is no time 
advantage using CheckFree. The time it takes to mail your bill payments is about the 
same. The risks for the consumer are minimal. Credit card companies will cover any 
losses more than $50. CheckFree is integrated into the banking community. However, 
you could perform the same transactions over the phone in the same amount of time. 
2. NetCheque 
Introduction 
The NetCheque system is a non-anonymous system developed by Neuman and 
Medvinsky (Wayner, 1996). The NetCheque system imitates check clearance banking 
therefore, anonymity is replaced by accountability. The NetCheque system relies on the 
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Kerberos system (Appendix A). Trust in this system emerges from a central server that 
can track all major transactions if necessary (Wayner, 1996). 
The Concept 
A NetCheque account works the same way as a conventional checking account. The 
check is created by bundling the standard information (i.e. amount of the check, type of 
currency, name of recipient, name of bank, account number, check number). When the 
consumer is making a purchase, the Kerberos is called up for a ticket containing a secret 
key that creates a secure link to the bank (Wayner, 1996). The consumer signs the check 
by computing a secure hash which encrypts the secret key (Appendix A). Security is 
generated this way using the Kerberos model. The NetCheque system also allows the 
check to be endorsed using the same signature mechanism. 
Conclusion 
The system imitates the normal check clearing system. The principle advantage of 
the Kerberos system is that it uses private key encryption. The problem with the 
Kerberos model is that it requires each user to generate tickets to sign their checks. The 
tickets may expire frequently which would require a more robust, on-line environment. 
The Kerberos model also only creates secure channels between two parties. Therefore, 
there is no way for anyone else to verify signatures. 
3. NetChex 
Introduction 
NetChex, a trademark ofNetl Inc., facilitates secure financial electronic commerce 
accommodating credit card and debit card payment methods. Consumers are not required 
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to purchase additional hardware or software if they currently have Internet access. The 
client technology requires a base line 386 machine or higher (NetChex, 1996). NetChex 
is an application programming interface (API) which is easily incorporated into existing 
electronic data interchange (EDI) systems (NetChex, 1996). The technology allows 
consumers to develop unique client user interface (UI) which uses NetChex to facilitate 
the secure transfer of fimds. 
Client Software Security 
The Client Software is defined as the executable modules which permit authorized 
users to gain access and transmit electronic checks (NetChex, 1996). NetChex does not 
depend on encryption to provide for security. Privacy of each transaction is provided for 
by applying cipher block chaining (CBC) methods to generate different private 
encryption keys for each transaction (NetChex, 1996). 
Sixteen digit assignable signature keys provide hardware authentication. A consumer 
may assign a signature key to a spouse and another to a child, each with individual 
password protection. The signature key can be activated or deactivated at NetChex. 
Therefore, if a consumer suspects that a key has been compromised, NetChex will no 
longer accept transactions with that signature (NetChex, 1996). The NetChex client 
technology links itself to each consumer's personal computer when it is installed. If the 
software is copied to another machine, it will not work. 
The security features designed into NetChex have been designed specifically to 
address issues of authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation. The 
security methods implemented in the NetChex electronic payment system are (NetChex, 
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1996): 
(1) Authentication: NetChex generates an integrated hardware key which incorporates 
characteristics specific to the PC on which the NetChex client is being installed. This key 
serves as the client's digital signature and is guaranteed to be unique for each member's 
installation. 
(2) Integrity: The NetChex software verifies the integrity of each transaction it receives 
over the Internet through the use of cipher block chaining (CBC) methods linking each 
transaction to all prior transactions. 
(3) Confidentiality: NetChex uses asymmetric and dynamic key encryption techniques to 
ensure the confidentiality of each transaction sent across the Internet. No confidential 
account specific information is transferred across the Internet in the processing of the 
transaction. 
(4) Non-repudiation: The NetChex client software is copy protected to avoid the chance 
of unauthorized use of the software. If the client is copied or moved it will stop 
functioning completely rendering the application useless. 
NetChex Functionality 
The consumer can use the NetChex system to generate electronic checks from a PC. 
Prior to transmission over the Internet, the NetChex system security replaces the 
consumers confidential bank account information with a shadow account used to identify 
them to the transaction processing segment of the system. The electronic check is then 
transmitted across the Internet to the NetChex closed system for processing. Once 
received the check is verified for authenticity against the member database. The shadow 
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account is replaced with consumer and merchant account information. The consumer is 
sent an e-mail confirmation of the check number and the transaction amount upon 
completion of a transaction. The authenticated transaction is then transferred across a 
private network to the appropriate banking system for processing. Once the transaction 
information is sent, standard banking rules are applied to complete the transfer of funds. 
(NetChex, 1996) 
Conclusion 
NetChex is designed to work within the existing bank infrastructure. NetChex does 
not replace the banks' role in the money transfer process. However, NetChex will be 
integrated in the ATM networks and in VISA/MC. NetChex offers the strongest user 
authentication among all ofthe Internet payment solutions (NetChex, 1996). Password 
protection and private hardware keys ensures authorize access. NetChex is a simple 
extension of the banking infrastructure to the Internet. 
J. ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEMS 
1. DigiCash 
Introduction 
The DigiCash company was created by David Chaum to build the software to use his 
cryptographic inventions. Electronic cash by DigiCash combines computerized 
convenience with security and privacy (DigiCash, 1996). The structure of the DigiCash 
system includes both account-based money and token-based money. Each person 
maintains a central bank account with DigiCash. A DigiCash Wallet is assigned to each 
person with an account at DigiCash. Token-based digital money is subtracted from the 
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central bank account at DigiCash for each electronic purchase (Wayner, 1996). 
Security and Privacy 
The security provided by electronic cash is superior to that of paper cash (Chaum, 
1996). Electronic cash is digitally signed by the issuer and makes disputes over payments 
impossible. No mutually trusted central authority is necessary. The DigiCash software 
performs the necessary functions to digitally sign checks on any hardware the user has. 
The digital signature transforms the transaction message that is signed. Therefore, 
anyone who reads it can be sure who sent it (Chaum, 1996). 
Privacy is achieved by an extension of digital signatures called blind signatures 
(Chaum, 1996). The digitally signed transaction is multiplied by a random factor 
generated by the consumer's PC to create the blinded signature. The consumer is 
anonymous. The bank and the merchant, however, receive no anonymity. Merchants do 
not want anonymous payments (Forrester, 1996). Merchants want to know who 
consumers are so they can tailor their advertising effectively. 
Blinded electronic bank transactions protect the consumer's privacy, but because each 
transaction is simply a number, it can be easily copied (Chaum, 1996). ·Each transaction 
is checked on-line against a central list maintained by Digi Cash. Verification of all 
transactions will prevent double spending ofEcash. However, no cryptographic 
protections exist (Wayner, 1996). 
Ecash Functionality 
A consumer making a purchase confirms the amount, merchant and description of 
goods. Ecash software installed on the consumer's PC transfers the correct value of 
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Ecash direct to the merchant. Merchants can then deposit the Ecash into their accounts. 
The merchant's bank receives the Ecash and is able to determine from the transaction 
number that it did not receive the same Ecash before. If a consumer does not have Ecash 
software, a DigiCash server can process the transaction. The consumer's PC needs to be 
operating with an HTTP server and the DigiCash server will perform everything in the 
same manner. (Chaum, 1996) 
CAFE 
CAFE is an acronym for Conditional Access for Europe (CAFE, 1996). CAFE is a 
project to develop electronic wallets and smart cards for Europeans to transfer cash 
electronically (Wayner, 1996). DigiCash is a major partner in the development of CAFE. 
The CAFE system is based on public key cryptography (Chaum, 1996). Digital 
signatures will be used to provide authentication and anonymity as in the Ecash system. 
CAFE is intended to unify European commerce by successfully handling all of the many 
different currencies (Wayner, 1996). The electronic wallets will hold value encoded in a 
variety of different currencies and the user may exchange the currencies by negotiating a 
rate. The future of the product depends on the political reaction to the system and how 
willing banks will be to join as partners of the project to make it a reality (Wayner, 1996). 
Conclusion 
Security is fundamental to electronic cash. DigiCash offers an electronic commerce 
solution which is being experimented with on the Internet worldwide (Chaum, 1996). 
However, no major banking partners are affiliated with DigiCash. Consumer anonymity 
is a problem for merchants trying to market their products. Merchants want to use the 
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Internet to build relationships with consumers and personalize their Internet storefronts. 
2. Magic Money 
Magic Money is an experimental system. The software was written by the Product 
Cipher company (Wayner, 1996). The system is similar to Ecash in that blinded digital 
signatures are used for authentication and consumer anonymity. Encryption is provided 
by Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and digital signatures use RSA Data Systems technology. 
The blinded digital signature algorithms are patented by Chaum providing anonymity 
(Chaum, 1996). Two software application programs exist (client and server): 
(1) Server - Acts like a bank. It validates, exchanges coin and maintains a list of spent 
coins to prevent double spending (Wayner, 1996). 
(2) Client - It validates coins, maintains an electronic wallet filled with coins, and turns in 
coins to the bank server when they are received (Wayner, 1996). 




The NetCash system used by NetBank (The First National Bank of CyberSpace) was 
developed by Neuman and Medvinsky (Wayner, 1996). NetCash offers consumers some 
anonymity. However, banks can track the spending oftheir customers (NetBank, 1994). 
NetCash payment coupons are traded via electronic mail. Consumers purchase NetCash 
by writing a personal check and faxing it to the NetCash Distribution Center (NetBank, 
1994). The consumer may use the NetCash payment coupons to purchase information, 
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goods or services. 
Currency Server Transactions and Security 
The center for activity in the NetCash system is the currency server (Wayner, 1996). 
The currency server exchanges NetCash coupons in two steps (Wayner, 1996): 
(1) The consumer includes a hash at random and encrypts the NetCash coupons with the 
public key of the currency server. 
(2) The currency server decrypts the incoming c~upons and checks for fraud. 
Encryption is provided by Pretty Good Privacy (NetCash, 1995). The security of the 
system also relies on one-way authentication. The currency server circulates its public 
key but each customer does not need to have one on file. The currency server is 
responsible for settling all payments. Accounts are balanced frequently and in real-time. 
(Wayner, 1996) 
Payment Transfer 
NetCash follows five basic steps to make a payment (Wayner, 1996): 
(1) Two parties establish a secure channel using a published public key or an anonymous 
channel using Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Appendix A). 
(2) The payer combines the NetCash, a session key and a session ID and encrypts them. 
(3) The payee gets the NetCash and verifies the signature with the correct certificate for 
the currency server that generated the NetCash and sends the NetCash to the currency 
server. The NetCash is combined with a new key and encrypted with the public key of 
the currency server. 
(4) The currency server checks the serial number ofthe NetCash to prevent double 
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spending. It sends the NetCash to the appropriate account for deposit. The currency 
server encrypts a message to be sent to payee proving that the exchange was completed. 
(5) The payee decrypts the message and issues a receipt to the payer and may sign it with 
a digital signature as a guarantee. 
Conclusion 
The NetCash transaction does not require that the customer and the merchant 
maintain active public keys and certificates. The authenticity of the NetCash is 
maintained by the currency server. The NetCash could be used off-line, but the merchant 
would not have any protection against double spending. NetCash provides the consumer 
some anonymity. However, if merchants conspire with banks, they can find out who 
their consumers are. 
4. Smart Cards 
Introduction 
Smart cards are unlike debit cards, which deduct money from a bank account after a 
purchase. Smart cards have an embedded microprocessor chip making it possible to 
store, retrieve and possibly manipulate data (Kezar, 1996). There are two basic types of 
smart cards (Kezar, 1996): 
(I) Stored Value Smart Card - A simple type in which a consumer buys with a preset 
dollar amount and spends down. When the value is zero, it is discarded. 
(2) Intelligent Smart Card- A versatile type in which the card's microprocessor can take 
value from a user's bank account whenever needed. An A TM could be used to add value 
to the card. 
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The intelligent smart card would be able to store not only cash balances, but also data on 
shopping patterns, store coupons, citizenship status, and medical history. Consumers are 
already seeing the benefit of the smart card, more than 30 million are being used 
worldwide (Kezar, 1996). 
European countries have been implementing the smart card technology over the past 
nine years. However, smart card systems never gained much momentum in the United 
States until recently (Kavanaugh, 1996). Two important changes have occurred since 
France implemented the technology in 1982 (Kezar, 1996). 
(1) Smart card technology has increased considerably and its costs have come down 
(Kavanaugh, 1996). 
(2) The rapid increase in credit card related fraud over the past several years (Chapter IV). 
a. Azteq Direct 
Azteq Direct based in San Rafael, California is a provider of computer hardware 
and software over the Internet. Azteq Direct is offering the simpler type of smart card 
which is closer to a debit card for making secure transactions over the Internet. The 
Azteq Direct Debit Card allows consumers to order hardware, software and memory 
without transmitting their credit card number on-line. The account is established over the 
telephone and the card arrives in the mail with a personalized PIN number. (Azteq 
Direct, 1996) 
b. Europay International 
Europay International was established in 1992. Europay is a combination of the 
eurocheque and eurocard ofthe 1980's (Europay, 1996). Europay has established an 
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Open Terminal Architecture (OTA) for an intelligent smart card allowing consumers to 
gain access to cash at thousands of terminals from different suppliers (Europay, 1996). 
The OTA standardizes Europay's smart card and introduces microprocessing chips. 
Europay and IBM teamed up in June 1995 to develop a microchip for cards using a 
multi-party secure open payment protocol (i.KP). The product developed is known as 
electronic purse (Europay, 1996). Electronic purse enables monetary value to be loaded 
onto a chip embedded in a payment card. Europay expects to convert all cards from 
magnetic stripe to chip beginning in mid-1997 (Europay, 1996). 
c. Mondex 
Mondex is a smart card-based electronic payment system. The microprocessors 
contained on the Mondex smart cards can communicate securely (O'Kelly, 1996). Cash 
equivalent value can be stored in the cards enabling consumers purchasing power at retail 
stores and on the Internet. Each time a Mondex card is used, the chip on the card 
generates a unique digital signature. The digital signature is the guarantee that the 
Mondex cards are genuine (Mondex, 1996). Mondex is an alternative to cash. The 
microprocessor can conduct transactions without involving a third party. Mondex 
provides a personal balance reader permitting an individual to easily check the balance on 
a Mondex card. Mondex cards have global potential. They can store up to five types of 
currency electronically (Mondex, 1996). 
d. NetFare 
NetFare is a pre-paid Information Access Card that operates like a telephone 
access card. The NetFare Card is designed for access to desired merchandise and for 
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downloading of data, games, forma software and single edition publications (NetFare, 
1995). NetFare purchases on the Internet are low risk because the NetFare card is 
purchased off-line. A NetFare transaction is a four step process (NetFare, 1995): 
(1) The consumer purchases a card for whatever amount is desired. 
(2) The consumer presents the card to a merchant to pay for electronic information at the 
point of delivery. 
(3) The merchant calculates the consumer's bill and checks that there is enough credit 
remaining on the card to pay for the product. 
(4) The product is delivered to the consumer. 
e. Visa 
Visa has developed an electronic purse. The electronic purse is a card with a 
micro chip that can be used instead of cash for everything from vending machines to 
public transportation (Visa, 1996). The electronic purse is similar to Europay' s electronic 
purse. The micro chip embedded in either a credit card, debit card, or stand alone card is 
able to store value electronically (Visa, 1996). 
First Union's automated teller machines supported the Visa smart card during the 
1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta (First Union Corp., 1996). Atlanta was selected for 
the debut because of its large, diverse population and the international visitors expected. 
First Union plans to expand the Visa smart card to other cities in 1997. Diebold, Inc., 
based in Canton, Ohio is providing First Union's automated teller machines the upgrades 
to support Visa smart-card-based transactions (First Union Corp., 1996). 
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Conclusion 
Smart cards are being developed to enable electronic funds transfer between 
individuals and not just between buyers and sellers. It is premature to state with certainty 
how many smart cards operating standards will ultimately exist. The chip card carries 
more information than a magnetic stripe card. And a chip card can make decisions, 
encrypt data and give the card holder the ability to control who has access to the data 
carried in the card. 
K. MICROPA YMENT SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
Micropayment systems support low cost purchases of information on the Internet. 
Speed and cost of processing payments are critical factors in assessing a protocol's 
usability (Baker, 1996). Fast user response is essential if consumers are to be encouraged 
to make a large number of purchases. Servers are required to have the capacity to deal 
with fluctuations in demand. Not everyone everyday will want to download a newspaper. 
However, if a major news story is being reported, the demand will dramatically increase 
(Abadi, 1995). On-line services providing newspapers, magazines, reference works, and 
stock prices all have individual items that could be inexpensive if sold separately. The 
ability to purchase inexpensive individual items would make these services more 
attractive to casual users on the Internet (Abadi, 1995). The following are statistics from 
the 1994 American Information User Survey on how much Internet user households are 
willing to pay for electronic publishing services. 
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Percent of Internet User Households 
Willing to Pay per Month 
I s1o-$19l =~~ 
I over $30 I 
D 1% II 29% Ill 39% • 25% 
Figure 30: American Information User Survey, 1994 
1. Micropayment Protocols 
a. Micro Payment Transfer Protocol (MPTP) VO.l 
D s% 
MPTP is used for low value transfers between parties for the purchase of 
information on the Internet. MPTP involves three parties (Baker, 1996): 
(1) A customer (making the payment) 
(2) A vendor (receives the payment) 
(3) A broker (a financial intermediary who keeps the accounts for both parties) 
Presently only a single broker model is considered. However, the protocol does not 
restrict the broker to use of a single server (Baker, 1996). 
MPTP uses shared secret and public key based digital signature schemes. Choice 
of algorithms and key length is left to the parties involved (Baker, 1996). A considerable 
degree of flexibility for establishing a payment policy is allowed by MPTP. It supports 
the use of multiple payment encounters to optimize processing time which shortens 
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payment time (Baker, 1996). 
Certificates bind a public key to an account number under the public key of the 
broker (Baker, 1996). The broker's public key is known to all parties. The problem with 
certificates is that they expire and need to be re-issued. It becomes difficult to track credit 
risks or permit certificates to be valid for long periods oftime (Baker, 1996). The broker 
in this protocol takes all risk of non-payment. However, MPTP permits the broker to 
transfer this risk to the vendor by refusing to guarantee payment (Baker, 1996). 
MPTP is a protocol· for Internet purchases of information. The protocol is also 
suitable for use as an access control or for resource allocation. An important 
characteristic which a micropayment scheme must satisfy is to permit access to both 
small and large publishers. Use of public key signature screening makes it economic for 
use by small publishers. (Baker, 1996) 
b. Millicent Protocol 
Millicent is a secure protocol designed to support information purchases over the 
Internet costing less than a cent. It is based on decentralized validation of electronic cash 
at the vendor's server without any additional communication, expensive encryption, or 
off-line processing (Abadi, 1995). The key innovations ofMillicent are its use ofbrokers 
and of scrip. Brokers take care of account management, billing, connection maintenance, 
and establishing accounts with vendors. Scrip is digital cash that is only valid for a 
specific vendor. The vendor locally validates the scrip to prevent customer fraud, such as 
double spending (Abadi, 1995). 
Security is achieved by using scrip and the brokers who sell it. Scrip represents an 
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account a customer has established with a vendor. The balance of the account is kept as 
the value of the scrip. When the customer makes a purchase with scrip, the cost of the 
purchase is deducted from the scrip's value and new scrip (new account balance) is 
returned as change. When the customer has completed a series of transactions, the scrip 
may be cashed in closing the account with the vendor. (Abadi, 1995) 
Brokers serve as accounting intermediaries between customers and vendors. 
Customers enter into long term relationships with brokers, similar to an agreement with 
an Internet service provider (Abadi, 1995). Brokers buy and sell scrip as a service to 
customers and vendors. Security and privacy is added to the Millicent protocol using 
shared secrets between parties and using the secret to set up secure communications using 
encryption (i.e. DES, RC4 or IDEA) (Appendix A). 
Initial implementation of Millicent for transactions across a network using TCPIIP 
has been efficient for purchases less than a cent (Abadi, 1995). The Millicent protocol 
price range covers most print and information services that will be available in an on-line 
format (Abadi, 1995). A Millicent-based Internet service is currently being developed. 
c. PayWord and MicroMint Protocols 
Pay Word and MicroMint are micropayment protocols developed by Rivest and 
Shamir (Abadi, 1995). Inspired by the Millicent Protocol, their goal is to minimize the 
number of public key operations required per payment using hash operations (Rivest, 
1996). PayWord is a credit-based scheme. Authentication is performed using public key 
cryptography (Appendix A). PayWord is optimized for sequences ofmicropayments. 
However,.it is secure and flexible enough to support larger payments (Rivest, 1996). 
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MicroMint is designed to eliminate public key operations totally. Security is sacrificed 
for speed (Rivest, 1996). 
(1) Pay Word: The Pay Word user establishes an account with a broker, who 
issues a digitally signed PayWord certificate containing the broker's name, the user's 
name, the IP address, and the expiration date (Rivest, 1996). The certificate has to be 
renewed monthly by the broker, who ensures the consumers account is in good standing. 
The certificate authorizes the consumer to make Pay Word transactions (Rivest, 1996). 
Pay Word does not provide consumers anonymity. However, some privacy is provided 
since there is no record kept as to which documents were purchased (Rivest, 1996). 
PayWord is summarized by the following (Rivest, 1996): 
(1) The broker is required to sign each certificate and perform one hash function 
application per payment. The broker stores copies of consumer certificates and maintains 
accounts for consumers and vendors. 
(2) The consumer is required to verify their own certificate and perform one hash 
function application per payment. The consumer stores their own secret key. 
(3) The vendor verifies all certificates and performs one hash function application per 
payment. The vendor stores all purchases and last payment received per consumer each 
day. 
(2) MicroMint: MicroMint is designed to provide reasonable security at a very 
low cost. MicroMint uses no public key operations at all (Rivest, 1996). MicroMint 
coins are produced by a broker who sells them to consumers. The broker issues new 
coins at the beginning of each month and the coins are only valid for that month. Unused 
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coins are returned to the broker at the end of the month to purchase new coins. 
MicroMint coins are represented by hash functions (MD5 and DES) (Rivest, 1996). 
MicroMint is not anonymous. The broker can detect a coin that is double-spent and can 
identify which vendors received them. It does not use digital signatures. Therefore, it 
would be difficult to legally prove who is guilty of duplicating coins (Rivest, 1996). 
2. Micropayment Companies 
a. Clickshare Access and Payment Service 
Clickshare provides consumers with a digital calling card using private key 
encryption allowing them to log in once and charge purchases from publishers at several 
Web sites to a single account (Clickshare, 1996). The Clickshare micropayment service 
also provides multi-site user authentication. Clickshare enables the anonymous tracking 
of individual users as they jump among unrelated Internet sites. The smallest transaction 
the system settles is ten cents. The Clickshare system remains in the developmental stage 
(Clickshare, 1996). 
b. CyberCash 
Please see Chapter VI section C. 
c. First Virtual Holdings Inc. 
Please see Chapter VI section D. 
d. Infosafe Systems Inc. 
Infosafe customizes and markets secure electronic distribution systems for digital 
information, video, graphics and software direct to end users from any electronic source. 
The company is currently testing its proprietary solution using DES to conduct secure 
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electronic financial purchases of information on the Internet (Info safe, 1996). The 
consumer benefits for Infosafe subscribers will be (Infosafe, 1996): 
(1) Greater access to information (24 hours daily) 
(2) Lower cost (pay for information used) 
(3) Cost tracing (track all transactions) 
(4) Internal Usage Controls (Manage information spending) 
The Infosafe system allows subscribers to search the library contents free, perform 
product comparisons and test demos of products offered through the system (Infosafe, 
1996). 
e. ZipLock 
ZipLock is an automatic distribution, payment system providing instant 24 hour 
access to digital content, including software, publications and information services. 
Developed by Astoria Software, ZipLock acts like an electronic safe-deposit box 
connecting the customer directly to the credit card processing company transferring funds 
to merchants for purchases (Astoria, 1995). The ZipLock system uses encryption 
technology from RSA Data Security, Inc. Credit card authorization occurs without the 
merchant seeing the customer's credit card. ZipLock uses a secure, direct modem 
connection between the customer and the credit card processor (Astoria, 1995). ZipLock 
has been in use since late 1995. 
L. ON-LINE BANKING SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
Commercial banks have shown only a limited interest in the Internet (Crede, 1996). 
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Some banks argue that the openness of the Internet makes it unsuitable for handling 
transfers of information relating to money and security would be almost impossible to 
implement (Crede, 1996). However, secure Internet payment systems are being 
developed and implemented by many companies (i.e. Visa, MasterCard and Netscape) 
and banks are starting to notice and rise to the challenge (Bank Administration Institution 
(BAI), 1995). 
1. BankAmerica Corp. 
BankAmerica Corp. is the second largest banking company in the Untied States with 
assets of $227 billion at second quarter 1995 (BankAmerica Corp., 1996). Bank of 
America has announced in June 1996 an on-line HomeBanking service which is available 
to consumers and small businesses through America Online and the Internet 
(BankAmerica Corp., 1996). Customers who sign up for HomeBanking are charged a 
$6.50 monthly fee. However, this fee can be waived if customers have a Versatel 
checking account with direct deposit (BankAmerica Corp., 1996). HomeBanking on the 
Internet requires users to have Netscape Navigator 1.22 or higher for Windows and 1.12 
or higher for Macintosh or UNIX systems. HomeBanking offers the following Internet 
features (BankAmerica Corp., 1996): 
(1) Quick Balance: This feature gives current balances for all HomeBanking accounts. 
(2) Account Information: This feature allows customers see and download all posted 
activity for each HomeBanking checking accounts for the current and the previous two 
statement periods. Customers can also review recent payments and transfers and see 
details of specific transactions or cancel any future payments. Customers will know 
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when a direct deposit has arrived or when a check has cleared. 
(3) Bill Payments: Customers can pay all of their bills on-line to individuals as well as 
businesses. Bill scheduling is offered up to one year in advance and have payments 
arrive precisely on time. 
(4) Transfer Funds: This feature moves funds easily between the Bank of America 
checking and savings accounts that are linked to HomeBanking and even advance funds 
from credit card accounts to other accounts. 
(5) Customer Service: HomeBanking provides secure e-mail access to customer service. 
(6) Financial Analysis and Planning: HomeBanking provides a software program 
(Managing Your Money) that gives customers analytical and planning capabilities. 
(7) Downloading and Importing: HomeBanking has a built-in Quicken Interchange 
Format (QIF) which is the industry standard for information exchange between personal 
money management software. This feature allows customers easily download the current 
session or the full detailed checking account activity into a personal spreadsheet or a 
personal money management program. 
Secure e-mail is provided by Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) or the Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extension (MIME). The security technology employed uses public-private, 
or asymmetric, key technology patented by RSA Security Inc. (BankAmerica Corp., 
1996). 
Bank of America has joined Netscape Communications Corp. providing businesses 
with a secure means for electronic commerce. Bank of America's payment service will 
allow business conducting Internet electronic commerce to accept Visa, MasterCard, 
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Discover Card, Diners Club, Carte Blanche, JCB Card or American Express card on-line 
(Netscape, 1996). The service will be based on Netscape Communications's Netscape 
Commerce Server software with additional transaction processing capabilities to handle 
payment processing. Customers may create their own Internet storefront using the 
Netscape Commerce Server. Bank of America is the only bank offering customers so 
many choices for accessing a home banking service (Bank.America Corp., 1996). 
2. Intuit Inc. 
Intuit Inc. plans to offer banking via the Internet with participating fmancial 
institutions using security provided by RSA Data Security by late 1996 (Intuit Inc., 
1995). Intuit is developing both a general interface for Internet banking and a customized 
version that will integrate Netscape Navigator. Intuit's new interface will include 
security features based on RSA Data Security encryption. Triple DES session keys will 
be exchanged using 1 024-bit RSA and will encrypt all banking data transmitted between 
the customer and their financial institution including PIN's (Intuit Inc., 1995). 
Each financial institution will decide pricing and servicing packaging for these new 
services. Financial institutions have the potential to reach more than 12 million people 
who use Quicken or America Online (AOL) and about one million who use other Intuit 
supported interfaces (Intuit Inc., 1995). Intuit has delivered electronic banking to 
customers of 22 participating financial institutions via Quicken since October 1995 and 
announced a strategic alliance with AOL to give subscribers access to on-line banking in 
November 1995 (Intuit Inc., 1995). The latest financial institutions to join Intuit Inc. are 
Alex. Brown & Sons, BankAtlantic, Bank of Stockton, Charles Schwab & Co. Inc., 
139 
Commerce Bancshares, Commercial Federal Bank, Dreyfus Services Corp., Fidelity 
Investments, First Hawaiian Bank, First Union Nation Bank, Laredo National Bank, 
Mellon Bank, PNC Bank, Republic National Bank of New York and Signet Bank (Intuit 
Inc., 1996). 
3. Security First Network Bank 
Security First Network Bank (SFNB) is the world's first Internet bank which provides 
software for other banks and financial institutions allowing them to offer on-line banking 
services (Security First Network Bank, 1996). SFNB became the world's first Internet 
bank on October 18, 1995 and within six weeks had more than I ,000 applications for 
checking accounts from people in 40 states, Japan, Australia and Canada (Northwestern, 
1996). Customer accounts can be accessed from any computer with a secure Internet 
browser (i.e. Netscape Navigator). 
Security First uses several layers of technology to ensure the confidentiality of its 
transactions across the Internet. Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is used to 
provide privacy for the data flowing between the browser and the bank server (Chapter 
V). The bank is protected by a system of filtering routers and firewall$ which form a 
barrier between the outside Internet and the internal bank network (Security First 
Network Bank, 1996). Security First uses Secure Ware's Secure Web Platform as part of 
its architecture for security within the bank itself (Security First Network Bank, 1996). 
The system meets the stringent B-1level security classification which the U.S. 
government reserves for highly sensitive military systems (Lafferty, 1996). 
Security First Network Bank is made up of two distinct parts. The Information Server 
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is the area potential customers use to learn about the bank and its services (Security First 
Network Bank, 1996). Once a customer decides to open an account, an encrypted 
registration form is sent to the Bank Server, which contains the actual banking 
applications (Security First Network Bank, 1996). The bank verifies the account 
information and creates a new account for the customer. Customers communicate with 
the bank using their World Wide Web browser. 
Security First Network Bank has achieved levels of data protection never before used 
in a commercial operation (Security First Network Bank, 1996). Consumers can be 
certain that as Internet security technologies evolve, Security First will continue to test, 
evaluate and implement those that might be beneficial (Security First Network Bank, 
1996). 
4. Wells Fargo Bank 
Wells Fargo provides customers with encrypted on-line banking sessions. 
Customers' banking session data is encrypted using Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL) protocol (Chapter V). Wells Fargo uses a thorough authentication process during 
enrollment to ensure that the customer is the only one who can access their account 
(Wells Fargo, 1996). Customers must enter their Social Security Number and a unique 
on-line password to begin a banking session. Wells Fargo only sends a partial account 
number over the Internet to protect the full account number (Wells Fargo, 1996). 
Information is also protected by an automatic sign-off capability terminating the session 
if the system is not actively in use for more than ten minutes (Wells Fargo, 1996). Wells 
Fargo Internet banking features are (Wells Fargo, 1996): 
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(1) View current balances on checking, savings and credit card accounts. 
(2) View cleared checks and deposits or withdrawals posted. 
(3) Transfer funds between accounts. 
( 4) Examine credit card charges and payments. 
(5) Download account transaction information to personal financial software. 
Customers can pay anyone (individuals or businesses) and schedule payments in 
advance from anywhere using a personal computer, a touch tone phone or a Wells Fargo 
Automatic Teller Machine (ATM). Recurring payments can be set up weekly, monthly 
or annually. Payments can be set up immediately and be changed or cancelled until the 




Electronically based payment systems are nothing new. These payment systems have 
been in operation since the 1960s and have expanded rapidly as well as grown in 
complexity. However, these payment systems are mostly proprietary closed networks 
developed by the banking industry for large value payment transactions. The rapid 
growth of the Internet has created new commercial opportunities for networked 
commerce. Recent developments in secure payment systems could permit the creation of 
a new cost-effective global payment system for low value payments. Internet payment 
systems will provide opportunities for the creation of completely new sets of national and 
global trading partners for small and medium businesses. 
The creation of an industry standard is crucial to widespread acceptance of financial 
transaction methods over the Internet. Several companies have developed financial 
transaction systems and are competing for consumer loyalty. Software and data security 
companies aggressively marketing their products, often tap into the consumers' concern 
about security issues. Consumer confidence will be gained with the acceptance of an 
industry standard backed by brand names they can trust. The Secure Electronic 
Transaction (SET) payment method due in late 1996 may provide the industry with the 
standard needed. SET has been aggressively developed by a strategic alliance of 
reputable companies in the industry including: Visa, MasterCard, Microsoft, IBM, and 
Netscape. 
The concern about security of fmancial transactions on the Internet is more of a 
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perception than it is a reality. Industry experts agree that financial transactions over the 
Internet are safer than conventional transaction methods. It is more dangerous to hand a 
credit card to a clerk at a retail store or a waiter at a restaurant, than it is to transmit your 
credit card number over the Internet. The most common credit card transaction is the 
"card-not-present" method. This method allows the merchant to take the credit card 
number over the phone without seeing the credit card. The opportunity for fraud with this 
method is great. Even when the consumer physically presents their credit card to a 
merchant, the number is sent over a telephone line at 1200 baud in clear ASCII. The 
financial transaction methods available for use over the Internet and analyzed in this 
thesis are more secure than conventional transaction methods. Credit card numbers are 
never sent over the Internet in the clear in these systems, and a majority of the methods 
studied use some form of encryption. 
It has been established that the financial transaction systems studied are secure. 
However, the barrier to electronic commerce is the consumer perception that these 
methods are not secure. These fears must be eliminated and the confidence of the 
consumer must be gained in order for electronic commerce to reach its full potential. The 
shopping experience must be convenient for the consumer, and they must feel that there 
is a value-added benefit of shopping online. Merchants must take advantage of the two-
way medium of the Internet to establish one-to-one customer relationships. 
The ability of the Web to amass, analyze, and control large quantities of specialized 
data can enable comparison shopping and speed the process of finding items. Search 
engines tailored to consumer preferences will enable this comparison shopping. 
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Consumers must have access to the Web in order to shop. Convenience of access is at the 
core of the adoption of any technological application and will determine its success. The 
penetration of home personal computers has exceeded one-third and modem access is 
19%. The penetration of home personal computers and convenience of access will level 
the demographic profile of an Internet user and render a more representable cross-section 
of society. This representative profile and increased access will lead to increased Internet 
sales. 
Sophisticated encryption and authentication technology has been viewed as the 
crucial enabling technology for electronic commerce over the World Wide Web. 
However, it must be remembered that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link; 
therefore, when implementing a system for the protection of data, both organizational and 
technical aspects must be considered. Merchants must have a security plan providing 
end-to-end protection. The best security product in the world can be compromised if not 
implemented correctly. 
The Department of Defense has been keen to emphasize security and strategic 
benefits through streamlining and integrating its business processes. h follows, then, that 
the DOD and the entire federal government has a stake in the Internet's capability to 
process secure financial transactions. This is particularly true where the DOD or other 
agency is receiving payments, making payments or communicating sensitive documents 
such as bids. This need for communication security will grow as more agencies and 
commands solicit bids from a geographically broad market of vendors through home 




Cryptography is the science of keeping messages secret. Once used almost 
exclusively by the military, the art of cryptography has become a valued asset in keeping 
data and computer systems secure (Ylonen 1996). The goal of any cryptosystem is to 





A cryptosystem provides secrecy by ensuring that an unauthorized source cannot 
derive plaintext from the encrypted ciphertext or given the ciphertext and the 
corresponding plaintext, the key used for encryption cannot be derived. Authenticity is 
realized when the source of a message can be validated and no replays of a previous 
message can be sent. Integrity is achieved by prohibiting the insertion, deletion, or 
modification of data. Cryptosystems provide non-repudiation when the sender cannot 
deny the transmission of data. A description of the most common algorithms used in 
cryptography are provided below. 
Symmetric (Private) Key Encryption 
The oldest and best-known forms of encryption use private keys that are known to 
both the sender and receiver. The key lengths of these systems vary in size, but all 
symmetric key systems use the same private key for encryption and decryption when 
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sending and receiving data. Several software products use symmetric key cryptography 
for fast bulk encryption. The following algorithms implement symmetric key 
cryptography. 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
The most common symmetric key algorithm used today is still the United States 
Government's Data Encryption Standard (DES). This algorithm was initially developed 
by IBM in the 1970's and reviewed by the National Security Agency before being 
released to the public. The system was adopted by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology as the standard for nonclassified U.S. government data in 1976 and has been 
recertified by the NIST every five years; last recertified in 1993 (Wayner 1996). DES 
was approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) as a private-sector 
standard in 1981 (Hartmann 1996). Today, DES forms the basis of several ANSI 
standards for financial institutions and is used in numerous applications world-wide. 
DES is a block encryption cipher. It uses a 64-bit block with a 56-bit key. There 
are two block encryption modes commonly used with DES. Encryption Code Book 
(ECB) is the simplest of the two modes. ECB encrypts 64-bit blocks independent of all 
other 64-bit blocks. The advantage ofECB is that only blocks in error need to be 
retransmitted, yet the disadvantage of this method is that identical plaintext blocks 
produce identical ciphertext blocks given the same key. The second and most commonly 
used mode is Cipher Block Chaining (CBC). This method takes each 64-bit plaintext 
block and XORs with the previous ciphertext block before being encrypted with the DES 
key. The XOR takes bit inputs (0 or 1) from the plaintext block and previous ciphertext 
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block and performs the logic operation exclusive OR as illustrated below: 
Inputs XOR 
0 0 0 
0 1 1 
1 0 1 
1 1 0 
Thus the encryption of each block depends on previous blocks and the same 64-bit 
plaintext block can encrypt to different ciphertext depending on its context in the overall 
message (RSA 1995). 
The DES algorithm encrypts data by repeating a basic scrambling in 16 rounds. 
Each round uses a different key derived from the single key provided by the user. The 
keys are derived from a key scheduling algorithm which is completed before enciphering 
or deciphering the information. The cipher text message is decrypted by applying the 
keys in the reverse order used to encrypt the message. 
Triple DES 
DES has never been broken, despite the efforts of many researchers over many years. 
The longer a cryptography method withstands the scrutiny of the public, the more secure 
the method is considered. However, it has been estimated that with today's computing 
power a customized machine built to perform an exhaustive search of all possible keys in 
seven days could be built for $1 million (Lieu 1995). 
A powerful technique for improving the security of DES is triple encryption. Triple 
149 
DES encrypts each message block under three different DES keys in succession. This 
technique overcomes the main weakness of DES, it's small key size. Triple encryption is 
thought to be equivalent to doubling the key size of DES, to 112 bits, and should prevent 
decryption by an enemy capable of single-key exhaustive search (Merkle-Hellman 1981). 
The main disadvantage of triple DES is that increased security has a cost of tripling the 
computational effort which results in a reduced speed and possibly an increase in 
processing hardware. 
IDEA (International Data Encryption Algorithm) 
IDEA was developed in the early nineties by Lai and Massey (Hartmann 1996). It is a 
block cipher which uses 64-bit blocks but a 128-bit key. IDEA was developed as a 
replacement for DES. Although the key size is twice as long as DES, IDEA has shown 
roughly twice the speed of DES in software implementations (Hartmann 1996). The 
fundamental innovation in the design ofthis algorithm is the use of table look-ups and 
substitution tables used in systems like DES have been dispensed with. Instead, the 
algorithm uses the operations from three different algebraic groups. The encryption 
process consists of eight rounds of encryption steps followed by an output transformation. 
IDEA has been designed to overcome both brute force (exhaustive search) and 
intelligent attacks. It has been under public scrutiny for over four years and no 
weaknesses have been discovered. Ascom, the Swiss telecommunications company who 
owns the rights to the algorithm, is so confident IDEA will not be cracked it has set a 
reward for cracking the algorithm. IDEA is one of the best-known new publicly available 
symmetric key algorithms. A considerable number of banks, international corporations 
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and government agencies have obtained site licenses and are using IDEA for protecting 
communications. POP which stands for "Pretty Good Privacy" invented by Phil 
Zimmerman also uses the IDEA algorithm in it's software package used for encrypting 
data files, signing files electronically, and key management. 
RC4 
RC4 is a symmetric key algorithm developed by Rivest ofRSA Data Security, Inc. It 
is a stream cipher, which means that it is basically a pseudo-random number generator 
where the number generated is XORed with the data stream. This makes RC4 ten or 
more times as fast as DES in software applications. However, since RC4 is a symmetric 
stream cipher, it is important that the same key never be used to encrypt two different 
data streams. It is useful in situations where session keys for each new message are 
produced. 
RC4 USES a variable key length up to 2048-bits. Most applications use a 40-bit key 
length, allowing them to export their product under current U.S. State Department export 
laws. DES, with a key length of 56-bits, is rarely approved for export other than to 
foreign subsidiaries or overseas offices of U.S. companies. An agreement between the 
· Software Publishers Association(SPA) and the U.S. government gives RC4 special status 
by means of which the export approval process is simpler and quicker than the usual 
cryptographic export process. The stipulation is that the key length must not surpass a 
length of 40-bits (RSA 1995). 
Security ofRC4 can be strengthened by adding a 40-bit string called a salt. The salt 
can be used to thwart attackers who try to precompute a large look-up table of possible 
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encryptions. The salt is appended to the encryption key, and this lengthened key is used 
to encrypt the message; the salt is then sent, unencrypted, with the message(RSA 1995). 
RC4 is widely used by developers who wish to export their products. It is also used 
domestically for superior symmetric key encryption (2048-bit) to DES for applications 
like bulk encryption. Products such as Lotus Notes and Netscape Secure Commerce 
Sever use the RC4 algorithm. 
SkipJack Algorithm/Clipper Chip 
The Skipjack algorithm was designed by NSA as a replacement for the aging DES 
algorithm. The Skipjack algorithm is classified, therefore few details are known. It is 
known that the Skipjack algorithm is contained in a hardware device known as the 
Clipper Chip. A consequence of Skipjack's classified status is that it cannot be 
implemented in software, but only in hardware by government-authorized chip 
manufacturers. 
The Skipjack algorithm uses an 80-bit key to encrypt 64-bit blocks of data, thus it is 
believed to be more secure than DES which uses only a 56-bit key. It is a symmetric key 
system and uses the same key for decryption. It is known that the algorithm uses 32 
rounds to scramble data. Another advantage is that the algorithm cannot be reverse 
engineered from the Clipper Chip. The decision to classify the algorithm has drawn 
criticism from experts in the field. They suspect that either the algorithm is insecure or 
that there is a trapdoor built into the algorithm (RSA 1995). 
The concept of a government designed standard such as the Clipper Chip has privacy 
advocates up in arms. The Clipper Chip attempts to balance the needs of law-
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enforcement agencies with industry and private individuals by using escrowed keys. The 
idea is that communications could be encrypted, but the keys would be maintained by two 
or more third party private escrow agencies. This way personnel and industrial 
communications would be kept secret, yet law-enforcement agencies could still tap 
suspected criminal communications with the appropriate court order (Lieu 1995). 
Privacy advocates are concerned that government and law enforcement agencies will be 
able to backdoor escrow agencies. They are also questioning how such agencies will be 
established and who will regulate them. 
Asymmetric (Public) Key Encryption 
The concept of public key cryptography was introduced in 1976 by Diffie and 
Hellman and later refined by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman in 1977 (RSA 1995). The 
private key systems worked well in small networks. As a network expands, the secure 
exchange of secret keys becomes increasingly expensive and unwieldy. An additional 
drawback to the private key system is the requirement of sharing a secret key. Each 
person must trust the other to guard the pair's secret key, and reveal it to no one. 
Essentially, this means that communication can only take place between people with 
some kind of prior relationship. Authentication and non-repudiation are also issues with 
the private key systems. Shared secret keys prevent either party from proving what the 
other may have done. Either can modify data and be assured that a third party would be 
unable to identify the culprit. The same key that makes is possible to communicate 
securely could be used to create forgeries in the other user's name (Verisign 1996). 
These problems were addressed by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 when they proposed a 
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method of exchanging secrets without exchanging secret keys. Public key cryptography 
uses key pairs, a public key and a private key. One key is used to encrypt the data while 
the other key is used to decrypt the data. The important feature is that the key used to 
encrypt the data cannot be used to decrypt the data. In a public-key system, one simply 
publishes their public key and keeps the private key secret. If someone wants to send a 
message that can't be read by anyone else, they look up the public key of the person and 
use it to encrypt the message. Only the person with that key can use it to decrypt the 
message (Wayner 1996). Hence public key cryptography solves one of the most vexing 
problems of all prior cryptography: the necessity of establishing a secure channel for the 
exchange of the key. To establish a secure channel one uses cryptography, but private 
key cryptography requires a secure channel. 
The key lengths used in public key cryptography are usually much longer than those 
used in private key ciphers. The problem is not guessing the right key, but deriving the 
matching secret key from the public key. It has been estimated that for the RSA 
cryptosystem, a 256 bit modulus is easily factored by ordinary people. A key length of 
384 bits is said to be susceptible to university research groups or companies and 512 bit 
key is within reach of major governments. It takes a 768 bit key or more to be safe in the 
long term (Ylonen 1996). 
Digital Signatures and Certification Authority 
A digital signature is analogous to a written signature. It uniquely and undeniably 
identifies the originator of a message. A user digitally signs a message which a recipient 
can verify. The signature has to be difficult to forge, yet easy to verify. This process is 
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accomplished by signing a message with the private key. This ensures that the message 
could only have come from the private key holder, yet anyone could verify that the 
message was genuine. 
Since public keys can be published in any directory without exchange through a 
prearranged trusted source, the issue of public key legitimacy surfaced. The argument is 
that anyone can masquerade in a computer network as a legitimate user receiving 
sensitive documents at a false account. There are currently two solutions to the 
certification issue: building a 'web of trust', and setting up official key issuing 
authorities. The web of trust works through personal recommendations. The public key is 
signed by other people who can vouch for the user. If the recipient trusts one or more of 
the people, then the message can be considered legitimate. Phil Zimmerman's PGP uses 
this method (Lieu 1995). The alternative is the central issuing authority. This 
organization creates a kind of digital passport or credential. The Central Authority (CA) 
digitally signs the user's public key, this is referred to as the Digital ID. Every time 
someone sends a message, they attach their Digital ID to verify the author's public key is 
authentic, then uses the public key to verify the message itself. Through the use of 
Digital ID's, an authentication chain can be established, allowing for convenient public 
key registration and certification in a distributed environment (Lieu 1995). 
Hash Algorithms 
Hash algorithms are used in conjunction with digital signatures for efficiency and 
authenticity. The hash algorithm produces a fixed-length string from a variable input. 
The fixed-length string varies in size depending on the algorithm. This string is called 
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the message digest. The shorter message digest is then encrypted using the private key of 
the sender, turning it into a digital signature. Since the hash algorithm is faster than the 
public key signing function, it is more efficient to compute the digital signature using a 
message digest, which is small, than using the entire document. 
The hash algorithm has the added benefit of providing data authentication. The 
strength of a hash algorithm rests in the one-way nature of the algorithm. It is easy to 
compute a hash value for a given input, but it is extremely difficult to derive an input 
which will produce a specified hash value. The recipient of a message decrypts the 
digital signature and then recalculates the message digest. The value of the newly 
calculated message digest must match the digest found in the digital signature exactly. 
Any deviation between the two message digest, whether intentional or unintentional, 
indicates the message has been altered and a problem exists. 
MD4, MD5, and SHS 
MD4, MD5, and SHS are the most recognized hashing algorithms in use today. MD4 
and MD5 are algorithms developed by Ron Rivest ofRSA Data Security, Inc. MD4 and 
MD5 produce 128 bit digests and there is no known attack faster than an exhaustive 
search. MD5 is more secure against attack than MD4, but it is also 33 percent slower. 
MD4 can also be modified to supply a 256 bit digest. MD5 is the most commonly used 
ofthe RSA Data Security, Inc. algorithms (RSA 1995). 
The Secure Hash Standard (SHS) is a hash algorithm proposed by NIST and adopted 
as a U.S. government standard. It is designed for use with the U.S. government's 
proposed Digital Signature Standard. SHS is based on MD4. The algorithm produces a 
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160 bit hash value which works well with the 160 bit modulus used by DSS. Due to the 
160 bit length of SHS it is considered more secure than MD5, but is also 25 percent 
slower due to the additional key length (Wayner 1996). 
RSA 
RSA is a public key cryptosystem invented in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman 
while at MIT (RSA 1995). It can be used for both encryption and signing. It is generally 
considered secure when sufficiently long keys are used. The security ofRSA is 
predicated on the assumption that factoring large integers is difficult. The RSA algorithm 
has endured over 15 years of scrutiny, yet there has never been an explanation of a 
reliable method to attack the RSA system (Wayner 1996). 
RSA takes two large prime numbers, p and q, and finds their product n=pq which is 
called the modulus. A number is then chosen, e, less than n and relatively prime to (p-
1)(q-1). The inverse,d, mod (p-1)(q-1) is found, which means that ed =1 mod (p-1)(q-1). 
e and dare called the public and private exponents, respectively. The public key is the 
pair (n, e); the private key is d. The factors p and q must be kept secret or destroyed 
(RSA 1995). 
RSA is used for privacy (encryption) as follows: Alice wants to send a private 
message, m, to Bob. Alice creates the ciphertext, c, by exponentiating: c = ml\e mod n, 
where e and n are Bob's public key. To decrypt, Bob also exponentiates: m =cAd mod n, 
and recovers the original message, m; the relationship between e and d ensures that Bob 
correctly recovers m. Since only Bob knows d, only Bob can decrypt. 
RSA is used for authentication as follows: suppose Alice wants to send a signed 
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document, m, to Bob. Alice creates a digital signature,s, by exponentiating: s = m"d mod 
n, where d and n belong to Alice's key pair. She sends sand m to Bob. To verify the 
signature, Bob exponentiates and checks that the message, m, is recovered: m = s"e mod 
n, where e and n belong to Alice's public key (RSA 1995). 
RSA is not a replacement for symmetric key algorithm, but a supplement to them. 
RSA is most widely used in a protocol referred to as a digital envelope. This protocol 
uses symmetric key cryptography for bulk encryption of the message and then encrypts 
the symmetric key using RSA cryptography. This method ensures the fastest possible 
encryption without the problems associated with key management of private keys. RSA 
can be used for plaintext encryption, but this use of RSA is extremely inefficient when 
compared to symmetric key systems like DES. DES is estimated to be at least 100 times 
faster than RSA in software applications and between 1,000 and 10,000 times as fast in 
hardware applications (RSA 1995). 
Diffie-Hellman 
Diffie-Hellman was the first public key cryptographic technique published. The 
security of Diffie-Hellman relies on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem 
(which is believed to be computationally equivalent to factoring large integers). It is 
primarily used for public key exchange for use in other private key crytosystems (Unruh 
1996). The system requires the dynamic exchange ofkeys for every sender-receiver pair 
and in practice, this exhange of keys occurs during every communications session. This 
two-way key negotiation is useful in further complicating attacks, but requires additional 
communications overhead. The Diffie-Hellman method also has no way to produce 
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digital signatures (Unruh 1996). 
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
DSS is a signature-only mechanism endorsed by the U.S. government. This system is 
composed of the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) and the Digital Signature Algorithm. The 
SHS is described above. The security ofDSA is based on the discrete log problem. This 
means that given a message, m, and a value, a, it is easy to compute m"a mod p where p 
is a prime number. If given another value n, it is difficult and certainly infeasible ato 
discover a value of, a, such that m"a mod p = n. That is, it is hard to take the discrete log 
ofn (Wayner 1996). 
The details of the DSA are unknown except that the modulus is 160 bits and the key 
size can vary from 512 to 1024 bits. A message is digitally signed the same as in any 
public key system. The message is first hashed with the SHS and then the DSA is used to 
sign the message. Encryption for key exchange is not possible with this system. DSS has 
not be released to the public for critisism, so the overall strength of the system cannot be 
evaluated. Many feel that DSS is a good system, but RSA has been available to the 
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Jan 94 30,000 
Jul94 46,000 
Jan 95 71,000 
Jul95 120,000 
Jan 96 240,000 
Jul96 488,000 
(Source: Network Wizards, 1996) 
Growth of the Internet 
Networks: 1988-2000 
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208 9 217 
235 9 244 
277 14 291 
280 33 313 
301 33 334 
312 34 346 
349 35 384 
372 38 410 
406 61 467 
421 95 516 
469 95 564 
504 99 603 
513 137 650 
592 153 745 
647 162 809 
646 191 837 
695 202 897 
699 228 927 
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Feb.90 762 235 997 
Mar.90 776 262 1,038 
Apr.90 1,224 301 1,525 
May.90 1,257 323 1,580 
Jun.90 1,301 338 1,639 
Jul.90 1,319 408 1,727 
Aug.90 1,442 452 1,894 
Sep.90 1,503 485 1,988 
Oct.90 1,536 527 2,063 
Nov.90 1,554 571 2,125 
Dec.90 1,575 615 2,190 
Jan.91 1,650 688 2,338 
Feb.91 1,700 717 2,417 
Mar.91 1,744 757 2,501 
Apr.91 1,829 793 2,622 
May.91 1,881 882 2,763 
Jun.91 1,993 989 2,982 
Jul.91 2,074 1,012 3,086 
Aug.91 2,192 1,066 3,258 
Sep.91 2,261 1,128 3,389 
Oct.91 2,342 1,214 3,556 
Nov.91 2,449 1,302 3,751 
Dec.91 2,855 1,450 4,305 
Jan.92 3,030 1,496 4,526 
Feb.92 3,152 1,588 4,740 
Mar.92 3,279 1,697 4,976 
Apr.92 3,485 1,806 5,291 
May.92 3,604 1,911 5,515 
Jun.92 3,737 2,002 5,739 
Jul.92 3,898 2,133 6,031 
Aug.92 4,112 2,273 6,385 
Sep.92 4,304 2,336 6,640 
Oct.92 4,788 2,566 7,354 
Nov.92 . 5,022 2,832 7,854 
Dec.92 5,366 3,195 8,561 
Jan.93 5,699 3,419 9,118 
Feb.93 5,904 3,678 9,582 
Mar.93 6,394 4,103 10,497 
Apr.93 6,790 4,462 11,252 
May.93 7,398 4,951 12,349 
Jun.93 7,709 5,461 13,170 
Jul.93 8,294 5,827 14,121 
Aug.93 8,895 6,265 15,160 
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Sep.93 9,625 7,071 16,696 
Oct.93 10,440 7,539 17,979 
Nov.93 11,558 8,106 19,664 
Dec.93 12,388 9,042 21,430 
Jan.94 13,625 9,869 23,494 
Feb.94 14,782 10,924 25,706 
Mar.94 16,612 11,966 28,578 
Apr.94 17,902 12,724 30,626 
May.94 18,829 13,541 32,370 
Jun.94 19,689 14,362 34,051 
Ju1.94 20,791 15,362 36,153 
Aug.94 21,984 16,323 38,307 
Sep.94 22,904 17,073 39,977 
Oct.94 23,812 17,708 41,520 
Nov.94 24,780 18,103 42,883 
Dec.94 25,910 18,779 44,689 
Jan.95 26,681 19,637 46,318 
--------Projected-------------
Feb.95 28,461 21,128 
Mar.95 30,359 22,731 
Apr.95 32,385 24,457 
May.95 34,545 26,313 
Jun.95 36,849 28,310 
Ju1.95 39,308 30,459 
Aug.95 41,930 32,771 
Sep.95 44,727 35,259 
Oct.95 47,711 37,935 
Nov.95 50,893 40,814 
Dec.95 54,288 43,912 
Jan.96 57,910 47,245 
Feb.96 61,773 50,832 
Mar.96 65,894 54,690 
Apr.96 70,289 58,841 
May.96 74,978 63,307 
Jun.96 79,980 68,113 
Jul.96 85,315 73,283 
Aug.96 91,007 78,845 
Sep.96 97,077 84,830 
Oct.96 103,553 91,269 
(Source: Internet Society, 1996) 
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